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ABSTRACT
Since Paul Grice first proffered his theory of
implicature, scholars have sought to apply it to
different linguistic genres. A review of the literature,
however, revealed that only a few studies have considered
the use of implicature as a strategy in argumentation and
none were found which analyzed its use as a strategy in
spontaneous informal debate. This thesis therefore seeks
to investigate the role, if any, that implicature plays
as a strategy in this genre. To this end, I collected
instances of spontaneous debate from television and radio
public affairs talk shows. The transcripts of these
dialogues were analyzed with a focus on the use of
implicature as a strategic rhetorical tool to gain an
advantage over an opponent in the argumentation process.
A number of possible benefits of the use of implicature
in this way were examined. Two of the most significant
are that it can assist in framing the topic of a debate
to the advantage of the implicature producer and that it
can be used to call into question the credibility and
therefore the validity of the argument of an opponent.
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CHAPTER ONE
THEORY OF IMPLICATURE
Introduction
It was one summer, while listening to the baseball
scores on the evening news, I noticed that almost every
night, the sports reporter said the same thing about the
New York Mets: "Those amazing Mets have done it again;
they lost!" Up until then, like most children, I was
under the impression that each word had a specific
literal meaning and intent. When entertainers, such as
the Amazing Kreskin, placed the word amazing in their
name, it was meant to be a good thing and to inspire
admiration. However, the Mets were not a team who were
admired by anyone; they were the worst of the worst. When
I asked my father about the apparent inconsistency in
what the reporter was saying, he explained that sometimes
there is a difference between what people say and what
they mean. In this case, he told me that the reporter
meant that the Mets were really bad, but that if he said
that every night, people might think that he was being
mean, therefore, he choose a fun way to remind the
audience of his meaning, without actually saying it.
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Little did I know at the time that I was being introduced
to Paul Grice's Theory of Implicature.
Implicature
Grice observed that it is a common practice in
language to communicate through implication rather than
through being direct and literal in our use of words. For
example, consider the following exchange:
Alice: "How is the food in that restaurant?"
Bill: "It's quick and convenient."
The literal meaning of Bill's answer is not responsive to
Alice's question as it does not address the quality of
the food. There are two possible explanations for this:
either he did not understand the question, or he feels
that his answer was responsive. Since the literal meaning
of Bill's words does not address the question, they would
have to have meaning other than their conventional
literal meaning. When there is a divergence between the
literal meaning of the words we use and the meaning that
we wish to convey, we could be using a linguistic device
that Grice calls "implicature." In the above example,
Bill's implied meaning is that the quality of the
restaurant's food is not the reason that people eat
2
there. If it was the reason, then we can assume that he
would have addressed the issue directly. Instead he talks
about other qualities of the restaurant such as speed of
service and convenience. From this Alice can reach the
conclusion that if she is not in a hurry, she may find
better food elsewhere.
Grice differentiates between two different types of
implicature: conventional and conversational. In
conventional implicature the recipient relies upon the
literal meaning of the words used to interpret the
meaning of the implicature. For instance, consider the
following example which rephrases a well known quote from
American humorist and philosopher Will Rogers:
"I am a Democrat, therefore, I belong to no
organized party."
In the above example the intended meaning is correctly
conveyed by the literal meaning of the words used, and
that is that the Democratic Party is by its nature, a
disorganized institution.
In contrast to conventional implicature,
conversational implicature requires the listener to work
out the meaning within the context of the dialogue.
3
Conversational implicature was demonstrated in the
example above in which Alice and Bill discuss the quality
of a restaurant's food. Bill's answer did not relate
directly to Alice's question which pertained to the
quality of the restaurant's food, and he gave no literal
indication in his reply that she might want to consider
eating elsewhere if she had the time. As Bill gave her no
guidance as to what meaning he was implying, she was
required to work out the meaning.
It should be noted that implicature is not
restricted to intelligible speech. Any mode of
communication which transmits meaning may create an
implicature. Hawley (2002) proposed that implicature can
be created by means other than clearly discernable
language utterances (non-verbal speech acts such as
gestures, facial expressions, silent pauses,
unintelligible utterances, etc.) and, as such, the
meaning of some implicature does not necessarily depend
on the meaning of words uttered, but on the context of
the speech act. For instance, if in the- course of a
public debate one participant purposely overlaps the
speech of another with mocking, unintelligible mumbling,
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he or she is creating an implicature, even though there
are no discernable words from which to work out the
meaning. In the aforementioned example, a plausible
interpretation of the implicature is that the speaker
thinks that his or her debate opponent's comments are not
on point.
The Cooperative Principle
Central to Grice's theory is that communication
through language is a cooperative endeavor. This does not
mean that participants in a communicative endeavor have
to have identical objectives (they seldom do), only that
they must observe rules of order which are required for
an efficient exchange to take place. The Cooperative
Principle views talk exchanges as rational human
behavior. Grice explains:
. . . that anyone who cares about the goals
that are central to conversation/communication
(such as giving and receiving information,
influencing and being influenced by others)
must be expected to have an interest, given
suitable circumstances, in participation in
talk exchanges that will be profitable only on
5
the assumption that they, are conducted in
general accordance with the Cooperative
Principle and the maxims. (Grice, 1989, p. 30)
What Grice means by this is that effective communication
requires all participants to be desirous of the common
goal of the dialogue and to limit their contributions to
those which advance' the agreed upon purpose of the
exchange. Therefore contributions which do not
efficiently promote the purpose of the exchange are
considered to be uncooperative and inappropriate. For
example, if I ask you how tall you are, it is not
appropriate for you to respond by telling me what size
shoe you wear unless, of course, by knowing your shoe
size, I can ascertain your height.
Grice proposed that there are four categories of
maxims under which participants would be required to
operate in cooperative communication: Quantity, Quality,
Relation and Manner. When certain maxims of cooperation
are violated, conversational implicature is created. As
long as the maxims are being openly and knowingly
violated it is assumed that there is a cooperative motive
to the implicature and that the hearer will be able to
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work out the purpose of the speaker's utterance. If, on
the other hand, a maxim is being violated unknowingly the
communication process can be confused. Finally, if a
maxim is knowingly violated and the producer of the
speech is attempting to keep this violation concealed,
then it is possible that the intent of the violation is
to deceive. Some suggest that this is often the case of
violations of maxims found in some advertising.
Gricean Maxims
Maxims of Quantity
1) Make your contributions as informative as
is required (for the current purpose of the
exchange).
2) Do not make your contributions more informative
than is required.
These maxims emphasize the effect on communication,
both of giving too little information and of giving too
much. Giving too little information may leave the
recipient of the communication without the necessary
input to properly interpret what the speaker is saying.
Giving too much information has its drawbacks as well.
Grice believed that "overinformativeness may be
7
confusing" and cited two concerns. Firstly he noted that
there is the possibility that excess information may
misdirect the discourse by raising side issues. Secondly
he believed that if the recipient is forced to sift
through excess information he or she may reach erroneous
conclusions by placing importance on irrelevant
information (Grice noted that in some ways, maxim 2 above
overlaps the category of Relation which is discussed
below).
Maxims of Quality
1) Do not say what you believe to be false.
2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate
evidence.
Grice consolidates these maxims into what he calls a
"supermaxim" as follows: "Try to make your contribution
one that is true" (Grice, 1989, p. 27). By this he means
that it is not necessarily a violation of the above
maxims if the information you give is false, unless you
know or believe it to be false. Additionally, even if you
believe that the information you are providing is true,
it may be a violation of maxim 2 above if you are
speculating and know that there is a reasonable chance
that your information may not be true.
Maxim of Relation - Be relevant
Grice notes that the simplicity of this statement
may be misleading in that the focus of relevance may
shift during the course of a conversation. At this point,
I believe that it would be helpful to borrow from the
caveat for maxim 1 of Quantity by modifying the maxim of
Relation as follows: Be relevant (for the current purpose
of the exchange). By making this modification, we
emphasize that the purpose of the exchange may be altered
during the course of the conversation.
Maxims of Manner
1) Avoid obscurity of expression.
2) Avoid ambiguity.
3) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4) Be orderly.
Grice clarifies the emphasis of the maxims above by
grouping them under the following supermaxim: "Be
perspicuous." By this he means that the Cooperative
Principle requires clarity and that efficient
9
communication is hindered when the means of expression
are inappropriate for the audience. Appropriateness may
vary from recipient to recipient or group to group. For
example, an expression which may be obscure and ambiguous
to one individual may be highly illustrative to another.
Maxim 3 above, "Be brief," does not necessarily mean that
one should use the fewest number of words possible, but
that the words that are used should be clear. Maxim 4
"Be orderly," emphasizes that organization of one's
thoughts is important. That is, a speaker's contribution
should logically lead the listener from one point to the
next. A discourse which is rambling may confuse the
listener and lead them to erroneous conclusions.
Maxim Violation and Implicature
Grice's maxims are violated on a regular basis,
however, not all violations create implicature.
Implicature requires that there be intent on the part of
the implicature producer to create implied meaning. If
the recipient, operating under the assumptions of the
Cooperative Principle, perceives an implicature because
of an unintentional violation of one or more maxims, then
the result of the exchange can be misleading. An extreme
10
example of this is depicted in the 1979 Peter Sellers
movie "Being There." In this movie, Peter Sellers
portrays the character named Chance, a simple-minded man
who has lived his entire life on the estate of a rich
Washington D. C. resident where he is employed as the
gardener. He has never left the estate, and his entire
knowledge of the world comes from the trivial TV shows
and cartoons that he watches constantly. When his
benefactor dies, Chance no longer has a place to live and
is forced to wander the streets. After suffering a leg
injury caused by being hit by a limousine, he meets the
rich and well connected Benjamin Rand. Chance has no clue
about how to relate to people. When asked questions by
Rand, he answers everything in terms of gardening and how
plants are nurtured. Rand perceives that Chance is
employing implicature to describe a genius philosophical
view of the world through the use of poetic metaphor.
Under our definition of implicature, however, Chance's
utterances would not count as implicature as he did not
intend to convey a meaning other than the literal meaning
of the words he used. Because of this misunderstanding,
Rand becomes Chance's new benefactor and introduces
11
Chance to his elite circle of Washington powerbrokers,
and even the President, all of whom share Rand's view of
Chance as a genius.
Grice noted four generalized categories of maxim
violation as follows:
1) The speaker may 'quietly' violate a maxim. A
quiet violation is one in which it is not obvious to the
recipient of the communication that an implicature is
intended. This can be done either unintentionally or
intentionally. If done unintentionally, confusion in the
communication may result. If the speaker is unaware that
he or she has made a violation and the recipient assumes
that the violation was intentional then the recipient may
assume a meaning which was not intended by the producer.
There may also be the case in which the speaker
intentionally violates a maxim in order to enhance his or
her meaning through the use of implicature, but the
hearer fails to recognize the maxim violation and
therefore fails to understand the intended meaning of the
speaker. An intentional quiet violation, on the other
hand, suggest something quite different than the above
examples. If, as noted previously, implicature is in
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concert with the Cooperative Principle, and to be such
requires an open and knowing violation of one of Grices's
maxims, then communication which conceals such a
violation, is not a cooperative endeavor and has an
alternative motive, such as the intent to deceive.
2) The speaker may opt out of both the maxim and
the Cooperative Principle. There are many reasons why one
might to choose to opt out, from the desire to avoid
unpleasantness involved in discussing a certain topic, to
the protection of one's rights. The best known example of
this is the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, often expressed in the following way: "I
refuse to testify on the grounds that the answer may tend
to incriminate me."
3) The speaker may be faced with "clash" between
maxims, being unable to comply with one maxim without
violating another. For example, it is a common for cable
TV companies to give a range of times between which the
installer will arrive at the house. Using this example,
consider the following exchange:
Customer: "What time will the installer be
here?"
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Cable Company-
Representative: "Sometime between noon and
6 P.M."
The cable company representative is aware of the fact
that the customer would like more specific information.
If, however, the representative lacks the information
then he is faced with a clash between maxims. The maxim
of Quantity requires that contributions be made as
informative as is required for the current purpose of the
exchange (which in this case would be a more specific
time frame). The maxim of Quality however, requires that
the contributor not to say anything for which they lack
evidence. Since the representative does not have the
information that is required to give a specific time
frame, he cannot simultaneously obey both the maxims of
Quantity and Quality. The representative makes a choice
that the maxim of Quality is more important and therefore
violates the maxim of Quantity. By violating that maxim,
the representative is implying that there is no way to
ascertain a more precise time.
4) The speaker may flout a maxim. This is a
situation in which the speaker overtly fails to follow
the maxim even though he is fully capable of doing so and
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he is not being limited by a clash (as noted in 3 above),
nor is he opting out of the Cooperative Principle.
Additionally, due to the overt nature of flouting he is
obviously not trying to deceive. Let us return to a
previous example:
Alice: "How is the food in that restaurant?"
Bill: "It's quick and convenient."
In the above example, Bill violates two maxims. Alice's
question requires a response which addresses the quality
of the food that the restaurant serves. Bill's response
violates the maxim of Relation as it does not answer the
question that Alice asked. The response also violates the
maxim of Manner as it is intentionally ambiguous. It is
obvious that Bill is familiar with the restaurant because
he knows that it is "quick and convenient." Therefore, we
can assume that he has the knowledge for a suitable
response. If we assume that Bill is complying with the
Cooperative Principle, we can reconcile his flouting the
maxims in this manner through the concept of implicature
in which Bill's communication assumes two things: first,
that Alice recognizes that he is violating a maxim and
second, that she can reasonably be expected to work out
15
the meaning that he intended, with the information that
she possesses.
Why We Use Implicature
Green (1987) proffered that "it is a commonly held
belief that direct communication is more effective than
indirect" and then asked the rhetorical question "why
then is implicature so pervasive in natural discourse?"
Noting that one survey of texts indicates that
implicature accounts for approximately 11% of all words
used, she argued that among the benefits of using
implicature over strategies of "being direct" are that it
can, at times, make communication quicker, safer, and
more effective (pp. 77-78). With respect to quickness,
implicature can be.thought of as a type of shorthand for
communication of meaning. For example, consider the
following exchange which uses implicature in lieu of
spelling out facts which are shared knowledge by both
participants.
Alice: "Before we go on vacation, we have to make 
arrangements to board the dogs at the
veterinarian."
Bill: "Their vaccinations are not current."
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Alice: "Oh, that's right. I'll take care of
getting their shots tomorrow."
Bill's reply is a time-saving implicature which
recognizes an issue that must be dealt with before they
can board the dogs. Without the use of implicature,
Bill's response would have been much longer, something
perhaps such as the following:
Bill: "The veterinarian will not allow dogs
to be boarded that do not have current
vaccinations. Our dogs do not have current
vaccinations; therefore, we will have to take
them in to get their shots first."
In the above example, the implicature used five
words while the non-implicature alternative used thirty
five words. Alice's reply to Bill's implicature makes it
obvious that she completely understands the implication
of the dogs -not having current vaccinations, that is,
that the veterinarian will not accept them for boarding
without shots, as they could pass illnesses on to other
animals in the kennel. Since the fact that the dogs must
have current vaccinations to be boarded is shared
knowledge between both Bill and Alice, Bill does not have
17
to spell out the facts and saves time by using
implicature.
In addition, as Green noticed, implicature can be
safer mainly due to the fact that it can be cancelled.
Because implicature requires the hearer to work out the
meaning, it is understood that there is a possibility of
misinterpretation. As such, to avoid adverse
consequences, the implicature can be cancelled and the
implicature producer can maintain that the hearer's
interpretation is incorrect. For example, consider the
following exchange:
Alice: "Clark can sure stretch a dollar."
Bill: "Well he has always been generous to me."
Alice: "No, I didn't mean to imply that he is cheap
in that way, I meant that he was a good
shopper."
In the above example, Alice makes an observation about
Clark's frugality. When Bill takes the comment
negatively, Alice cancels the implicature and rephrases
her comment.
An additional reason why implicature can be safer is
that it can be used as a face-saving device for both the
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speaker and the recipient (Brown and Levinson, 1987).
Brown and Levinson define "face" as the image that an
individual wishes to project to others (e.g. that he/she
is considerate of others, generous, polite etc.) Any
social interaction which may require an individual to act
contrary to this image is called a.Face Threatening Act.
Politeness strategies such as implicature assist in
avoiding such face threatening situations in
conversational interaction. For example, in many
situations, asking for a favor can be a socially
uncomfortable situation for both the requester and the
person of whom the favor is being asked. When asking for
a favor, there is both the possibility that you may be
embarrassed if you are turned down and that the person of
whom the request is being made may be embarrassed if they
have to turn you down. To avoid embarrassment, you could
phrase your request in an implicature to provide both you
and the person that you are making the request of a face­
saving way out. For example, consider the following
exchange:
Alice: "I don't know how I am going to get to
work tomorrow. My car is in the shop."
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Bill: "Well, I don't know if I would have the
time to help you out. I have to take
the kids to school, and that's in the
other direction."
Alice: "No, no, I know that it would be too much of
an imposition for you. I'm pretty sure that I
can get my sister to give me a ride."
In the above exchange, Alice was hinting that she
needed a ride to work, but since she did not ask Bill
explicitly, she was able to cancel the implied request
when Bill started offering reasons why it would be an
imposition for him to assist her. She cancelled the
request by indicating that Bill had misunderstood what
she was saying, "No, no, I know that it would be too much
of an imposition for you." By canceling the request Alice
has created a face-saving way out for both her and Bill.
In an alternative scenario, Bill answers Alice with
what could possibly be an implicature of his own.
Alice: "I don't know how I am going to get to
work tomorrow. My car is in the shop."
Bill: "I hope you can find a ride."
20
In the above example, Bill either did not understand that
Alice was hinting for a ride, or he could not or did not
want to assist her. If Bill just did not pick up on
Alice's hint, then his reply is not an implicature
because the intent to create an implied meaning does not
exist. If however, Bill did understand that Alice was
making a request for assistance, then his answer is an
implicature, because he is violating the maxim of
Relation (in that his reply does not relate to Alice's
implied request). The implied meaning of Bill's reply is
that he either cannot or does not wish to assist her.
Since Alice did not openly make a request, she is not
embarrassed when Bill does not offer to assist her. Bill,
on the other hand, saved face because he was not put in
the awkward position of turning Alice down as his answer
appeared to be nothing more than a polite wish for her
well being. The difference between the two scenarios is
that, in the first example, Alice actually cancelled her
implicature and, in the second example, neither Alice's
nor Bill's implicatures were cancelled. Thus it is noted
that an implicature does not have to be cancelled in
order to provide face saving.
21
Finally, there is some evidence that the use of
implicature can make one's words more memorable. Green
noted that a number of studies have made the connection .
between the mental effort it takes to.understand a
concept and the ability to recall it. "There is
experimental evidence that the more one thinks about the
meaning of what is being said, the deeper and more long
lasting the impression it makes" (p. 29). Therefore it
follows that because implicature requires the hearer to
work for meaning, the information has a more lasting
impact. This tactic is effectively used in persuasion in
venues such as political debates and advertising. In
1984, during a Democratic primary presidential debate,
Walter Mondale addressed Gary Hart regarding the
substance of his platform. Mondale asked Hart, "Where's
the beef?" This was a take off of a Wendy's Hamburger
restaurant chain commercial which asked the same question
about their competitor's hamburgers. Mondale's comment
was a pointed accusation against Hart's platform, that
is, that it had no substance. Mondale's comment is still
referred to today, nearly twenty years later, in news ’
analysis, political talk shows and political science
22
classes. His point regarding Hart's platform would
probably have not caused the stir that it did, nor have
been long remembered if he had been direct and said
something like; "Senator Hart, your platform has no
substance."
Chen (1996), also commenting on "motivations for
using implicature," observed,
An implicature is believed, for the most part,
to require more mental effort for the speaker
to produce and for the hearer to interpret than
its literal counterpart. It also runs the risk
of being misunderstood. Given that human beings
are rational (a fundamental assumption in
Grice's theory), there must be independent
reasons for speakers to use implicature (pp.
32-33).
Chen (1993) looked at how the use of implicature
benefited the speaker who produced it. He proposed that
there were three basic motivations to use implicature
which he labeled the Principles of Politeness, Self
Interest and Expressiveness. In regards to the Politeness
Principle, Chen notes that the desire to be polite "very
23
often conditions what you say" (Chen, 1993, p. 62). For
example, consider the following exchange:
Alice: "Bill, what did you think of that movie?
You've got to love it!"
Bill: "Well, I think the storyline went over my
head."
In the above exchange, Bill was able to indicate
that he did not share Alice's enthusiasm for the movie
without saying anything directly negative which may have
reflected poorly on Alice's taste in movies. Implicature,
therefore, allowed Bill to get his meaning across, while
still maintaining a polite regard for the fact that Alice
had a different opinion.
In regards to the Self Interest Principle, Chen
notes that the speaker's response is shaped by a
consideration of how it would affect him personally. "In
a given society, there are certain things that, if said,
would produce undesirable consequences, regardless of
whether that something is true or not" (Chen, 1993, p.
62). For example, consider the following exchange between
Alice and Bill, a married couple who are shopping for
clothes:
24
Alice: "I think this dress makes me look fat.
Do you think I need to loose weight?"
Bill: "You know, some manufacturer's sizes are
just cut small."
In the above example, Bill has implied that he agrees
that the dress does not fit properly; however, in an
effort to preserve domestic tranquility, he has violated
the maxims of Quality and Relation because his answer did
not address the question of whether or not his wife
needed to lose weight. Chen explains behavior such as
Bill's by explaining that "self interest makes us say
things in vague, indirect, tentative or veiled ways"
(Chen, 1993, p. 62).
Finally, the Expressiveness Principle is used when
the speaker has strong emotions and wishes to pass on
that emotion "forcefully and effectively, leaving as much
impact psychological, aesthetic, or otherwise, is
possible on the hearer" (Chen 1993, p. 62). This type of
implicature is often found in political rhetoric. An
example is this November 1956 statement of Soviet Union
Premier Nikita Khrushchev speaking to a reception for
Western diplomats in the Kremlin: "Whether you like it or
25
not, history is on our side. We will bury you." The
phrase, "We will bury you," violates the maxim of
Relation as it does not relate directly to the previous
discussion regarding the global competition for influence
between the communist system and the western democracies.
The statement was not meant to be taken literally. It was
designed to be emotion-packed, and it was. It scared a
lot of people who had mental images of Russian troops
actual burying American bodies after an actual war.
Khrushchev, however, was speaking metaphorically of his
belief that communism would succeed in its quest for
global domination.
Previous Applications of Gricean Theory
A number of scholarly works have applied Implicature
to analyzing aspects of spoken and written discourse.
Some examples of genres in which the use of implicature
have been examined are plays, poetry, written political
discourse (published articles), advertising, political
speeches and professional communications. Of particular
relevance for this thesis are the uses of implicature in
persuasive discourse.
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In a Gricean study of literature, Chen (1996), for
example, in his article "Conversational Implicature and
Characterizations in Reginald Rose's Twelve Angry Men"
examined the fictional characters in Rose's play and
demonstrated how the personalities and character of
individuals can be seen in "their violations of
particular conversational maxims" (p. 31). Also analyzed
by Chen are the motivations that the characters have for
using implicature. Among these are that implicature is
used as a strategy in argumentation.
Chen (1993) also looked at the use of implicature in
metaphor. While he specifically looked at poetry, he
concluded that since "metaphor works on the same
principles regardless of where it occurs," (p. 70) it is
safe to extrapolate the role of conversational
implicature in metaphor to all forms of communication. In
this examination, he noted that while Grice explains the
mechanics of implicature, he did not explain why an
implicature producer may prefer violation of the maxims
over being direct. Chen proposed that one major
motivation for the use of implicature through poetic
metaphor is the desire of the poet to add impact and
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emotion to his or her message. "As a result, the speaker
uses language elaborate in structure and deviant from the
norm, which might sacrifice clarity and easy
understanding as specified by Grice's Cooperative
Principle" (Chen, 1993, pp. 61-62).
The advantages that Chen ascribed to the poetic
metaphor may be equally true when applied to
argumentation in prose. For an example of.this, refer
back to the earlier example of Walter Mondale's comment,
"Where's the beef?" Mondale's use of a metaphor to make
his point that Senator Hart's platform lacked substance
greatly increased its impact as it was widely reported in
the press. As mentioned earlier, it is doubtful that a
more direct phraseology such as "Senator Hart, your
platform has no substance" would have attracted as much
attention.
In another analysis of the use of implicature by
fictionalized characters, Gautam and Sharma (1986) looked
at the dialogue in the play, Waiting for Godot. The
authors demonstrate how implicature (especially when it
violates the maxim of Relation) can be used to reflect a
general attitude (such as indifference or annoyance) that
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the implicature maker has toward what another is saying.
This view is interesting because it supports the theory
that implicature can be used as a strategy in
argumentation. In this play one of the characters uses
this strategy to show distain for an opponent's arguments
in an effort to minimize its effectiveness.
Drawing upon examples from written political
discourse, Winn (2002) looked at how implicature is
employed in political debate to intensify the emotional
appeal of one'.s message. In this study, Winn analyzed
articles from three contributors to Guns & Ammo Magazine.
In these articles, all three writers—Charlton Heston,
Jim Grover and Chuck Klien—are strong proponents of
safeguarding rights enumerated in the Constitution of the
United States under the Second Amendment. As this is a
sensitive topic for both supporters of the Second
Amendment and those who favor gun control laws, the
rhetoric can be very emotional. Winn proffered that all
three authors used aggressive writing styles in which
implicature was used frequently to strengthen the force
of their arguments, and she concluded that "Implicature
often will enable writers to dispense vivid imagery to
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strengthen a claim; instill fear in or establish a
relationship with an audience; denigrate their opponents"
(Winn, 2000, p. i).
In another example of how speakers can use
implicature to manipulate their audience, Newstead (1995)
suggested that an erroneous perception can be promoted by
using syllogistic reasoning. A syllogism is:
A form of deductive reasoning consisting of a
major premise, a minor premise and a
conclusion; for example, All human beings are
mortal, the major premise, I am a human being,
the minor premise, therefore I am mortal, the
conclusion.(The American College Dictionary,
1993)
Newstead noted that errors in interpretation can arise
when people perceive a relationship between two
statements just because they occur within close proximity
to each other. He explains, "It seems quite likely that
the Gricean principle of relevance can explain why people
are inclined to draw conclusions when none is warranted,
since it is assumed that the speakers would not make two
completely unrelated statements" (Newstead, p. 663). It
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has been, argued by some that what Newstead calls "Gricean
errors" in reasoning are not always entirely accidental,
but are actually promoted, as argued by Smith below.
Smith (1997) looked at how conversational
implicature is used in advertising in the weight loss
industry to argue the benefits of using the
manufacturer's products and/or services. She found, much
like Winn did in the example of the articles from Guns &
Ammo Magazine above, that advertisers use implicature to
strengthen claims, create imagery and to bond with their
audience. She concluded, however, that there was an
overwhelming propensity for this industry's advertising
to quietly violate maxims in order to take advantage of
cancellability. Smith contended that the motive was the
intent to. deceive.
When an advertiser feels it is necessary to
suggest things for which no substantiation
exist, implication is a safe means of
■accomplishing his or her advertising goals. It
is safe, because as Grice (1975) notes, what
was implied can be cancelled by the
speaker/writer at any time.(Smith, 1997, p. 68)
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Such cancellation allows the advertiser to deny that the
intention was to mislead and that the recipient simply
misunderstood the message. While this study refers to
print advertisement, the technique of canceling and
subsequently denying nefarious intent is effectively used
in oral debate. An example of this would be when a debate
participant makes a charge which can not be substantiated
and is challenged by his or her opponent. In this
instance the speaker can cancel the charge, claiming that
what was- said was misinterpreted, therefore minimizing 
any damage to his or her own credibility.
Supporting the existence of this argument technique,
Riley (1993) studied the use of implicature in
professional communications such as found in business and
government. She found that there can at times be a fine
line between the violation of a maxim to create an
implicature and the violation of a maxim for the purpose
of deceit, noting that "problems can arise not just in
deliberately deceptive documents, but also in those whose
authors are attempting to remain noncommittal, to
mitigate negative news or to show deference to unfamiliar
or more powerful readers" (p. 194).
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While the existing research suggests that
implicature is used in various ways as a premeditated
strategy in discourse, no studies to my knowledge have
investigated the use of implicature as a tool of
persuasion. Specifically, the thesis will study the
possible motivations that informal debate participants
may have for using implicature in structuring their
arguments and the strategic benefits they gain from use
of such implicatures.
The outline of the rest of the thesis is as follows:
chapter two will provide a context for the present study
by examining the theoretical foundations of rhetoric and
argumentation and how they are applied to the talk show
format, chapter three will consists of a close
examination of transcripts recorded from talk shows, and
chapter four will the present conclusions from this
research.
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CHAPTER TWO
ARGUMENTATION, IMPLICATURE AND ORAL DEBATE
Introduction
This chapter focuses on an exploration of
argumentation from its theoretical roots to modern day
theory and its practical application in everyday
discourse. Some of the frameworks for analyzing argument
reviewed in this chapter will be applied to the present
study of implicature in current affairs talk shows. I
begin with some current definitions of what argumentation
is as it is employed in everyday discourse and then take
a look back at the theoretical foundations of "formal"
argumentation and reasoning as described by Aristotle. I
then consider modern day scholars who have built upon
Aristotle's foundations and expanded it to apply to
informal debate (or everyday discourse). Special
attention is paid to Toulmin's model put forth in his
book The Uses of Argument (1958) ■. Finally, I discuss oral
argumentation specifically, exploring the unique
characteristics of television and radio talk show debate
.programs, the goals and objectives of participants, and
the rhetorical tactics used to gain advantage.
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Some Current Definitions of Argumentation
One modern definition of the word "argument" is two
or more people having an emotional disagreement, that is
"a quarrel; a dispute" (The American Heritage College
Dictionary, 1993), such as in "Alice and Bill had a big
argument, and they are not talking to each other now."
While "hot, interpersonal dispute is among the commonest
conceptions of argument" (Walton, 1985, p. 2), another
definition, found in the study of logic, refers to the
presentation of a deductively reasoned position on an
issue under examination. According to Toulmin, Rieke and
Janik (1979), "An argument, in the sense of a train of
reasoning, is the sequence of interlinked claims and
reasons that, between them, establish the content and
force of the position for which a particular speaker is
arguing" (p. 13).
It is important to note, however, that even in
reasoned exchanges, arguments can be presented in
passionate and emotional ways and, therefore, at times
may in fact sound like or have the qualities of a
quarrel. Toulmin, Rieke & Janik (1979) define the line
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between quarreling and a "train of reasoning" by the
rationality of the arguer:
Anyone participating in an argument shows his
rationality, or lack of it, by the manner in
which he handles and responds to the offering
of reasons for or against claims. If he is
open to argument, he will either acknowledge
the force of those reasons or seek to reply to
them, and either way he will deal with them
in a rational manner. If he is deaf to
argument, by contrast, he may either ignore
contrary reasons or reply to them with
dogmatic assertions, and either way he fails
to deal with the issues rationally, (p. 13)
Argumentation is one of the most common forms of
both oral and written communication. In our everyday
lives, we are constantly making arguments in an effort to
influence others,, and we are constantly exposed to the
arguments of others in their efforts to influence us.
Many college textbooks instruct students about the
prevalence of argument in discourse. Among them, for
example, Rybacki & Rybacki (2000) note that:
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To discover argumentation, all you have to do
is observe the daily attempts to influence
your beliefs and behavior. Some efforts will
be aimed at your emotions, prejudices, and
superstitions, but some will use information
and reasoning in an attempt to influence you.
Most people we encounter—friends, family,
teachers, employers, the mass media,
advertisers, editorialists and politicians—
offer arguments embedded in persuasive appeals
to encourage us to think as they do or behave
as they wish us to. (p. 2)
Furthermore argumentation requires that there be a
desire on the part of the arguer to influence decision
making, behavior or beliefs. Without the intent to
influence an audience, argumentation does not exist.
Fahnestock and Secor (2002) note that rhetorical analysis
is based on the assumptions that "speakers and writers
have intentions or designs on readers and hearers" and
that they seek to persuade the audience to "believe what
the speaker believes, and to act as the speaker
recommends" (p. 177).
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Argument and Rhetoric
One tradition of the formal study of argumentation
as a science began in the democratic institutions of
ancient Greece where everyday citizens were called upon
to participate in the functions of government (such as
acting in the capacity of officers of the court and in
the law making process). The study of rhetoric
(communication skills) was therefore an important part of
education in this society (Rybacki & Rybacki, 2000).
Aristotle proposed that there were three basic
tactics of argument: pathos, ethos and logos. Pathos
relates to arguments which appeal to the emotions of the
audience. An example of this is found in Richard Nixon's
1968 speech at the Republican National Convention during
which he accepted the party's presidential nomination. He
ended this speech by making reference to the terminally
ill former President Dwight Eisenhower when he said
"Let's win this one for Ike!" By doing this, Nixon was
not just speaking to the delegates, but he was making an
emotional argument to the entire country, that by
electing him, they would be honoring the former
president. Ethos relates to persuasion which is
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accomplished through the credibility accorded to the
speaker or source of the information. This is especially
important in deliberations in which the exact knowledge
of the "truth" is not possible. According to Rapp (2002),
Aristotle believed that in order to establish credibility
a speaker must display (1) practical intelligence, (2) a
virtuous character, and (3) good will. A speaker, who is
perceived by the audience to be lacking in some or all of
these qualities will create doubt in the minds of the
audience as to the veracity of the claims he or she is
making. "But if he displays all of them, Aristotle
concludes, it cannot be rationally doubted that his (or
her) suggestions are credible" (pp. 6-7). Logos relates
to persuasion which is accomplished through logic either
through induction or deduction. Induction is a process in
which a generality is derived from a particular set of
facts. For example, consider the following argument: "It
seldom rains in Orange County, California in the month of
August. If we plan a trip to Disneyland in August, it is
unlikely that it will rain on us." Deduction, by
contrast, is a process in which one fact must follow
because of the existence of another fact, such as in the
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following argument: "All men are mortal. Aristotle was a
man; therefore, Aristotle was mortal."
Toulmin's Model and Implicature
Perhaps the most widely studied and accepted modern
model of argumentation is that put forth by Stephen
Toulmin in his book, The Uses of Argument (1958). Toulmin
rejected the constraints of formal logic and advanced the
proposition that the traditional theories of rhetoric and
logic did not sufficiently explain the processes involved
in everyday modern informal debate. Toulmin opined that:
. . . it begins to look as though formal logic
has indeed lost touch with its application and
as if a systematic divergence has in fact
grown up between the categories of logical
practice and the analysis given them in
logicians' textbooks and treatises, (p. 9)
Traditional theories were based on either absolutism or
relativism and focused on a search for "Truth." The
modern study of rhetoric and argumentation, on the other
hand, "attempts to explain and critically evaluate
everyday disputations, adversarial and dialogical
reasoning" (Saeedi & Sillince, 1999, p. 114). The goal of
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this type of argumentation (informal logic) is not
necessarily to search for truth but to "persuade the
listener to choose the outcome he (the debater) prefers"
(Glazer & Rubinstein, 2001, p. 158).
Toulmin's model is broken down into six components:
claims, grounds, warrants, backing, modality and rebuttal
(Toulmin, Rieke & Janik, 1979) .
Claims: This is an assertion put forth by an
Grounds:
arguer that he or she wishes to have
accepted as a fact.
These are facts put forward which support
Warrants:
the validity of the claim.
These are facts and assertions, either
stated or unstated, that make a causal
connection between the grounds and the
claim.
Backing: These are facts and assertions, either
Modality:
stated or unstated, that support the
validity of the warrant.
This is a gualifier used to indicate that
there is a possibility that the grounds
may not lead to the claim.
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Rebuttal: This is an extraordinary circumstance
which renders the logic of the warrant
invalid.
To illustrate Toulmin's model, consider the
following example:
Alice: "We should go out to dinner tonight. We've
had a hard day, and it should make us feel
better (in the past when we have had a hard
day and we have gone out to dinner, it has
made us feel better), providing we don't have
to wait too long."
In the above example, the claim is the phrase "We should
go out to dinner tonight," as this is the proposition
that Alice would like to have accepted. The grounds are
embodied in the phrase "we've had a hard day," as this is
the support that Alice gives to justify her proposition
that they should go out to dinner. The warrant is the
phrase "it should make us feel better." This phrase makes
the connection between the claim "We should go out to
dinner" and the grounds embodied by the statement "we've
had a hard day." The backing is the unspoken fact, noted
within the parenthesis, which provides support for the
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validity of the warrant. In the above example, the
backing consists of the previous experience that Alice
has had: that when she has had a hard day, going out to
dinner has often made her feel better. It is significant,
however, that going out to dinner does not make her feel
better 100% of the time. This is indicated by the fact
that there is a modality embodied in the word "should" in
the warrant phrase "it should make us feel better." This
indicates that there is a chance that going out to dinner
will not make Alice feel better. Finally, the rebuttal is
the phrase "providing we don't have to wait too long."
This is a circumstance which would render the logic of
the warrant invalid, as Alice knows that if she has to
wait too long, her mood will not improve.
In Toulmin's model, when the warrant is unspoken,
the gap of information between the claim and the grounds
is bridged through the use of an implied argument. Krejci
(2000) linked implicature to argumentation by comparing
Grice's theory of conversational implicature to Toulmin's
warrants. He noted that both "take into account a wealth
of unstated assumptions which speakers, writers,
audiences and readers carry in their minds and employ in
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order to interpret language" (Krejci, 2000, p. 27).
Krejci contends that both implicature and warrants rely
upon making a leap between premise and conclusion. To do
this, an assumption is made that there is shared
knowledge between the parties which provides enough
information to fill in the gaps where there are unstated
assumptions of logic.
A claim may embody an implied meaning as well and
can be used to form an implicature which attacks a debate
opponent. One example is found in the September 26, 1960
Presidential Debate between John Kennedy and Richard
Nixon. During his campaign, Kennedy had frequently used
some form of the phrase, "We can do better," and in his
opening statement of this debate, he did it again as
follows:
I think we can do a better job. I think we're
going to have to do a better job if we are
going to meet the responsibilities which time
and events have placed upon us. (Kennedy-Nixon
Debate, 9/26/1960)
Kennedy's comment, "I think we can do a better job,"
makes an implied claim that no matter how good a picture
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Nixon may paint of the record of the Eisenhower-Nixon
Administration, it has failed because even greater
progress was possible. Nixon recognized this attack in
the following statement from his opening remarks:
I think we disagree on the implication of his
remarks tonight and on the statements that he
has made on many occasions during his campaign
to the effect that the United States has been
standing still. (Kennedy-Nixon Debate,
9/26/1960)
Oral Argumentation
The forums in which argumentation take place vary
greatly from casual social settings to those which are
extremely formal and highly regulated in every detail.
Some examples of these venues include office break-rooms,
barber shops, pubs, coffee shops, internet chat rooms,
staff meetings, newspaper editorials, radio and
television talk shows, PTA meetings, academic
conferences, articles in scholarly journals, criminal and
civil court proceedings, congressional debates, and
sessions of the United States Supreme Court. Toulmin,
Rieke & Janik (1979) note that, as the objectives of each
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unique forum vary, "the procedural organization of the
resulting discussion is correspondingly different, and
the manner in which claims and arguments have to be
presented and defended also differs" (p. 15).
Generally speaking, "broad rules apply to all forms
of .argumentation" but there are also "specific rules
which apply only to certain forums" (Toulmin, Rieke &
Janik, 1979, p.15). It is logical to assume that each
format develops because it is thought to best serve the
objectives of the discourse participants. For example, an
oral or written format will have advantages and
disadvantages for different argument objectives. The
written format used in academic research papers, for
instance, is well suited for the discussion of
complicated theory and the presentation of large amounts
of data. A permanent record allows for the luxury of
unlimited time for colleagues to thoroughly examine an
argument, test data and develop supporting or contrary
arguments. Oral arguments, on the other hand, are well
suited for situations in which time is limited and in
which the standards of evaluating an argument are
significantly lower than that noted in the example of
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academic research above. Such is the case in radio and
television public affairs debate programs in which the
need to entertain the audience with a lively discussion
outweighs the documentation of facts and the presentation
of supporting data. When burden of proof standards are
set low, this allows an arguer the opportunity to present
as evidence unsupported, irrelevant or even false
information in an effort to influence the audience.
Steering in Oral Debate
One area of interest in the study of oral argument
is how participants cooperate in the roles they take on
in driving the course of the debate. For any cooperative
endeavor to be productive, participants are required to
at least tacitly agree on some basic rules or
organization to govern the activity. Sillince (1995)
notes that "Discourse analysis assumes that coherence and
sequencing are motivated by a cooperative and informative
role with regard to discourse partners. One of the
conversation partners (the 'steerer' - Scholtens, 1991)
develops a plan and the other (the follower) follows" (p.
414). In cooperative dialogue, a switch in roles can
naturally occur during the course of a conversation. This
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realignment generally takes place as a collaborative
effort between the discourse participants with the desire
to make the transition as smooth as possible. It is
important now to make a distinction between argumentation
and the type of cooperative dialogue described above.
While argumentation is a cooperative endeavor because it
requires certain basic ground rules, participants may
find it advantageous not to cooperate in sharing the role
of being the steerer. In argumentation found in the genre
of television and radio public affairs talk shows, for
instance, all participants seek to seize and maintain the
role as the steerer, because the steerer has the power to
define the terms of the debate. Therefore, participants
in argumentation "may find that surprise, deceit,
distraction and complexity are useful weapons" (Sillince,
p. 414} to accomplish this goal.
Hutchby (1996) studied such power struggles in oral
argumentation roles in open-line talk radio programs
(Note: An "open-line" program is one in which members of
the listening audience are invited to call into the
station and become participants with the host. This
format is in contrast to programs in which the host
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converses only with an invited guest). In his study, he
argued that "asymmetries" of power existed in these
conversations between the host and the callers (p. 9) and
that participants take advantage of the "unequal
distribution of resources" (p. 3) to control the course
of the discourse. Using transcripts from talk radio
conversations, he examined numerous rhetorical devices
used by participants to exercise control over the topic
of discussion. He studied how arguments develop and the
techniques that are used by participants to create
A
advantages by requiring an opponent to abandon his/her
position as a proponent of a proposition in order to
defend against an attack on his/her proposition or
evidence.
Hutchby claimed that many of these asymmetries were
built into the institutional setting of the talk radio
format and that in some instances they uniquely favored
the host over the caller. One example of this is that
while the caller has the opportunity to speak first and
therefore he or she chooses the topic and frames the
debate, the host, going second, has the first opportunity
to rebut and therefore steer the course of the dialogue.
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A caller therefore can easily be made to abandon his or
her position as a proponent of a proposition and be
forced to defend his or her position from a framework
that the host has constructed to his or her own
advantage. Hutchby examined other rhetorical devices as
well which are used by both hosts and callers to exercise
control and steer the course of an argument. While
implicature was not one of the devices that he examined,
it is one purpose of the present study to determine if
implicature can also be used as a strategy to steer
argumentative discourse.
Persuasive Attack and Defense 
in Oral Political Debate
One way to control or steer dialogue in informal
debate is to attack an opponent's credibility or
argument. This is because such attacks most always
require the person being attacked to respond to the
issues raised in the attack. Failure to respond may be
seen by the audience as an admission that the charges
made in the attack are true. In an analysis of modern
political rhetoric, Benoit and Wells (1996), in
Candidates in Conflict: Persuasive Attack and Defense in
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the 1992 Presidential Debates, looked at persuasive
attacks and persuasive defenses in the presidential
debates between George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Ross
Perot. A persuasive attack seeks to depict an opponent in
a negative light in the eyes of the audience through
linkage to an undesirable act. "The disgraceful act may
be an offensive deed, word or even an undesirable
cognition (belief, value, attitude or opinion)" (p. 29).
As such, persuasive attacks may take the form of a
characterization of a debate opponent's character or
logic in a way which is designed to diminish the
credibility of the individual being attacked in the eyes
of the audience. (This echoes the Aristotelian theory of
ethos and logos). A persuasive defense is a reaction to a
persuasive attack and is designed to repair or restore
the image of an individual who is the target of an
attack.
Benoit & Wells suggest that the use of persuasive
attacks, especially on character, were common in the 1992
Presidential Debate series. They illustrated this fact
through the observations of political columnist William
Safire on Bush's strategy in the first debate.
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"Commentators could hardly miss the fact that Bush
pressed his attacks against Clinton in the first debate.
Safire observed that judgment and character were 'the
President's main shot at his challenger . . .'" (p. 107).
Benoit & Wells' analysis of the three presidential
debates categorized the topics of discussion into
thirteen topic areas. Honesty and integrity was the third
most common issue addressed (just behind the economy and
federal fiscal policies, with Bush using this issue in
persuasive attack more than two and a half times as much
as Clinton did.
Persuasive attacks on ethos are not always directly
stated, but can involve implicature as demonstrated by
the dialogue between Alice and Bill below:
Alice: "If you really cared about the children,
you would support the school bond issue."
Bill: "People who are really concerned about
education are more interested in
implementing the new curriculum that I
have proposed than in throwing more money
at outdated programs that don't work."
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In the above exchange, Alice uses implicature to make a
persuasive attack on Bill's ethos. She does this by
violating the maxim of Relation in that "caring about the
welfare of children" is not directly related to a school
bond issue. Her implied meaning is that Bill does not
care about children. Bill's reply is not only a
persuasive defense but also a persuasive attack of the
same kind that Alice made. In his defense, Bill first
implies that he does care about "the children" because he
has developed a new curriculum. This restores his ethos
from Alice's attack. With the same statement, he is able
to make an unusual maneuver in that he is able to launch
a persuasive attack on Alice's ethos in the same way that
she challenged his. His implication is that she does not
care about children because she does not support his new
curriculum.
It should be noted, however, that attacks do not
always elicit a response. This is because the person
under attack must perceive that the accusation will be
believed and will be viewed negatively by the audience
(Benoit & Wells, 1996). If the person under attack does
not perceive the accusation as harmful to the image that
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he or she is attempting to portray to the audience, then
ignoring it may be an effective strategy and even an
implicature in its own right. By ignoring an overt
accusation, the person under attack may be implying that
the charge is frivolous and not worthy of a rebuttal,
thus attempting to minimize its effectiveness.
The Present Study
The present study explores the ways in which
implicature plays an integral part of modern informal
oral debate and is used as a purposeful technique by the
speakers not only to display their own views in a
positive way with increased impact, but to portray their
opponents in an unfavorable light. This study provides an
analysis of the effects of implicature in the arguments
of talk show debates, paying attention to how implicature
works in appeals to ethos and logos in persuasive attacks
and defenses and in attempts to steer debate. The broad
research questions which will be addressed are as
follows:
1. Is implicature used as a strategy in
argumentation?
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2. If implicature is used as a purposeful
strategy, what advantage does it provide to
the arguer?
For this analysis, I obtained data samples of
spontaneous, informal debate. The Sean Hannity Show on
radio, the O'Reilly Factor television show, and the
Hannity and Combs television show were selected for this
purpose because they are notorious for producing a high
volume of confrontational and argumentative discussions
on controversial topics. This format is well suited for
the study of argument strategies because the participants
are acting as advocates (similar to trial lawyers) and
view the encounter as a competitive process. The object
of this competition is to win over public opinion. As
advocates, the arguers may use different methods in
communicating their positions, including implicature.
Shows such as these are distinct from mainstream
news programs in that the hosts are well known political
partisans and often conduct interviews with guests of
opposing philosophies in a contentious and argumentative
style. In the talk radio genre, the hosts also take calls
from listeners. While most of these calls are friendly
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to the hosts, there is also a significant number which
become contentious and argumentative. Because of the
free-wielding style of shows such as these, the
participants place limited value on politeness and, in
fact, want to place their opponents in face-threatening
situations in order to question their credibility and
show their opponents' arguments in an unflattering light.
The data collection process consisted of randomly
recording ten complete programs of each television show
and ten one-hour segments of the radio show. All of these
recordings were reviewed and a total of four
conversations within these segments were then selected
and transcribed. The criteria for selection were that the
conversations consist of confrontational argumentation,
contain implicature and be of sufficient length (two to
four minutes was found to be optimal) to obtain enough
turn-taking in order for patterns of argumentation
strategies to emerge.
The transcripts were examined for instances of
maxim-breaking and implicature. Each instance of
implicature was then analyzed for its possible meaning
and for whether it was used as either an attack or
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defense mechanism. An analysis was then made of the
benefits that the speaker may hope to gain .from the usage
of the implicature, with close attention paid to the
effects that the implied attack or defense have on the
rhetorical appeals used and the steering of the argument.
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CHAPTER THREE
IMPLICATURE AND TALK SHOW ARGUMENTATION
Introduction
In this chapter, I will examine the use of
implicature in the informal debate genre of television
and radio public affairs talk shows. The word debate as
it is used in the present study is defined as any
deliberative public dialogue meant to influence the
opinions or actions of the audience. To understand the
concept of informal debate, it is helpful to contrast it
with the traditions of "formal" debate. The study and
advancement of formal reasoned deliberative discourse is
found in the academic field of Forensics. The use of
formal deliberative dialogue in public affairs decision­
making dates back to the ancient Greeks. This process of
argumentation was so strongly revered that they:
. . . organized contests for speakers that
developed and recognized the abilities their
society felt central to democracy . . .
Because the training in this skill of public
advocacy, including the development of
evidence, found one of its important venues in
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the law courts, the term "forensic" has also
become associated with the art of science of
legal evidence and argument. (What is
forensics, n.d., americanforensics. org)
Formal debate, as practiced by academic
organizations such as the American Forensic Association
and the National Forensic Association, is highly
structured and involves strict rules on turn-taking and
the type of evidence allowed. Most specifically, heckling
and talking over an opponent are not allowed and any
evidence which is used to support an argument must be
thoroughly referenced and be of the highest reliability.
(Code of forensic program and forensics tournament
standards for college and universities, n.d.
americanforensics.org; NFA code of ethics, n.d., National
Forensics.org).
By contrast, informal debate, as defined by this
study, is any type of deliberative dialogue which does
not have established and enforced rules of turn-taking,
decorum and evidence. This definition can apply to
everyday conversations between family, and between
friends and acquaintances, as well as quasi-institutional
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settings such as town meetings and radio and television
talk shows.
The Background of the Talk Show Format
The emergence of the talk radio format is chronicled
by the Ken Mills Agency (a talk radio industry consulting
firm) and Carla Gessell-Streeter (a talk radio researcher
and instructor of speech at Cincinnati State Technical
and Community College). Talk shows as an entertainment
format have been in existence since the earliest days of
commercial radio broadcasting in the mid 1920s. While
music and dramatic presentations made up an overwhelming
majority of programming in the 1920's and 1930's, talk
formats such as news and informational programming (on a 
wide range of subjects such as cooking, farming, weather,
etc,) were also considered a practical and popular use of
the electronic media. In the early shows, due in large
part to technical limitations, it was not possible to put
phone calls from listeners directly on the air. On
occasion, however, the hosts of some shows would take
phone calls and then repeat what the caller said into the
microphone. This was among the first attempts to make the
electronic talk medium an interactive activity. In the
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early 1940s, broadcasters like NBC Radio presented panel 
discussion shows such as the "University of Chicago
Roundtable" and "America's Town Meeting." These shows
proved to be popular with radio station network owners
because they were popular with the audiences and were
inexpensive to produce. By 1945 technology had advanced
sufficiently to allow the broadcasting of voices from 
telephone lines directly onto the air. Taking advantage
of this, an overnight disc jockey at WMCA radio in New
York broadcasted a live, impromptu conversation with a
caller, who just happened to be the well-known big band
leader Woody Herman. Based upon the enthusiastic audience
response to this program, Gray's show was transformed
into one in which he regularly interviewed celebrity
guests in the studio and took calls from listeners. The
talk show format was refined throughout the 1950's, and
in the early 1960's, some radio stations began to adopt a
format known as "all talk, all the time." (A Quick
History of Commercial Talk Radio From the Thundering Herd
to the Thunder of Rush, n.d., kenmillsagency.com; Gesell-
Streeter, n.d., radiotalk.org).
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A perceived limitation of the talk radio format was
a Federal Communications Commission policy issued in 1949
which became known as the "Fairness Doctrine." The
philosophy of this doctrine was that broadcasters were
"public trustees" and, as such, had an obligation to
present balanced points of view on controversial topics 
of public discussion. As a result of this, if a program 
was considered to be one-sided, opponents could sue the
broadcaster to provide equal air time for their points of
view. As this would be expensive for the station owner,
many issued guidelines to their hosts to avoid taking 
controversial positions on the air. (A Quick History of
Commercial Talk Radio From the Thundering Herd to the
Thunder of Rush, n.d., kenmillsagency.com).
In 1987, there was a broad deregulation of both the
radio and television industries by the Reagan
Administration, and the Fairness Doctrine was terminated.
Taking advantage of this and combining it with new
technology which enabled live radio shows to be
nationally broadcasted, The Rush Limbaugh Show on radio
became an enormous commercial success, combining an
unabashed conservative philosophy with what some consider
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to be an over-the-top, in-your-face style. (A Quick
History of Commercial Talk Radio From the Thundering Herd
to the Thunder of Rush, n.d., kenmillsagency.com).
In the mid 1990's the Fox News Channel brought the
informal debate talk show format to national television
with the Hannity and Colmes and the O'Reilly Factor
television shows. These are one-hour nightly shows,
similar in format to public affairs talk radio shows in
their free-wielding debate styles. They differ from
radio shows, however, in that they do not take listener
calls. All debate opponents are public figures or
newsmakers and are on camera. After their successes on
television, both Hannity and O'Reilly launched nationally
syndicated radio talk shows. Like on television, on
radio, Hannity and O'Reilly interview public figures but
also devote a significant amount of time to taking calls
from the audience, and discussing their views. Like
Limbaugh, both Hannity and O'Reilly have aggressive, in-
your-face styles. Hannity is a self-declared Republican
partisan, while O'Reilly is a former ABC News
correspondent and a registered independent who prefers
not to have a political label attached to him. (Sean
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Hannity is a Media Superstar!, n.d., Hannity.com, Bill's
Bio, n. d., Billoreilly.com)
It is from both the radio and television shows of
Hannity and O'Reilly that I have selected the data for
the current study. The reason that I selected these shows
over that of the Rush Limbaugh program is that they
devote a much greater percentage of their air time to
interactive dialogue, while Limbaugh commonly engages in
extended monologues and seldom interviews people.
The Analysis of the Data
The rest of this chapter presents my analysis of
transcripts of spontaneous informal debate from the
selected radio and television public affairs talk shows.
This analysis will focus on examples of strategic uses of 
implicature (uses motivated by the desire to gain an
advantage over an opponent in the argumentation process).
This analysis will focus on examples of implicatures that
participants use to make attacks on their opponents or to
defend themselves and will examine how the use of
implicature affects the course of the dialogue. The
transcripts appear in full in the appendix.
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It may be helpful at this point to present a brief
context for each conversation: Conversation 1 was between
Sean Hannity and Kevin, a listener who called into the
radio program. Preceding this conversation, Hannity had
been discussing the upcoming runoff election for the
U. S. Senate Seat in Louisiana between the Democratic
incumbent Mary Landrieu and the Republican challenger,
Susan Terrill. Conversation 2 is from the Hannity and
Colmes television show and features Sean Hannity and Jake
McGoldrick, a San Francisco City/County Supervisor,
discussing McGoldrick's opposition to the federal anti­
terrorism legislation known as the Patriot Act. The final
two transcripts are from The O'Reilly Factor television
show. In conversation 3, Bill O'Reilly and Bob Filner, a
Democratic congressman from San Diego, discuss the merits
of the impending United States military action in Iraq.
Finally, in conversation 4, Bill O'Reilly and Miles
Solay, a youth organizer for the "Not in Our Name" anti­
war group, discuss the philosophical foundations of that
group.
In chapter one, I discussed the foundations of
Grice's theory of Implicature and in chapter two I noted
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the similarities between how implicature operated and the
operation of Toulmin's unstated warrants and backings.
Grice and Toulmin are describing similar phenomena but in
different contexts. Grice concerns himself with the
general mechanics and benefits of using implicature while
Toulmin places this rhetorical device specifically into
the framework of modern informal argumentation. He notes
that much of the time the grounds and warrants that
support claims are implied. This is possible because the
speaker is relying on knowledge which is shared between
him or her and the recipient of the communication.
Another aspect of implied communication found in argument
(which will be illustrated at length in the analysis
which follows) is that implicature can function as a
claim. This is clearly illustrated in the previous
example of Walter Mondale's comment "Where's the beef?"
In that instance, Mondale used a rhetorical question to
make the claim, through implicature, that Senator Hart's
platform was lacking in substance; and we will see in the
following analysis that claims achieved through
implicature also serve as persuasive attacks and defenses
in public affairs talk shows.
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Persuasive Attacks on Ethos
As noted in chapter two, a persuasive attack is a
characterization of an opponent's character, values,
motivations, actions, logic, etc. in an unfavorable
light, in an effort to influence the audience. This
echoes the Aristotelian view that the intellect,
character and values of the speaker are essential
elements that audiences consider in the evaluation of an
argument and that, if these characteristics of a speaker
are brought into question, then that speaker's
credibility and therefore his or her argument may be
damaged in the eyes of the audience. It is important to
note that attacks on ethos through implicature are often
very subtle. Rather than directly assaulting an opponent,
the speaker may simply make claims which lead the
audience to the conclusion that the opponent is lacking
in credibility. For example, a speaker may challenge his
or her opponent's credibility based on lack of experience
or an association with others whose credibility is
questionable.
An examination of the data showed that persuasive
attacks on ethos were a common occurrence in each of the
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four transcripts and often took the form of an
implicature. In the two examples below, we see how each
interlocutor uses implicature to attack the other's
character in terms of honesty and credibility. These
examples are taken from the Sean Hannity radio show. The
participants are Hannity (the host) and Kevin (a caller),
who claims to be an non-aligned voter. They are
discussing the 2002 U.S. Senate race in Louisiana.
1-1 Hannity: "Alright now, Kevin, Louisiana, let's
start with you on the Sean Hannity Show. What's
up Kevin?"
1-2 Kevin: "Hello Sean, I'm just listening to you
here describe the election in Louisiana and
explain like what you think the differences
between Landrieu and Terrill and it just
doesn't match up with reality, and I was just
wondering . . ."
1-3 Hannity: "Do you work for Landrieu?"
1-4 Kevin: "No I don't work, I don't work for
either political campaign (unintelligible)."
1-5 Hannity: "Obviously voting for Landrieu."
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1-6 Kevin: "Huh? Yeah, holding my nose and doing
it. I'm not a member of either political party
actually, so I am an independent."
After Hannity's greeting, Kevin begins the
conversation by introducing the subject that he wants to
talk about (Line 1-2). In his introduction, he uses an
implicature to characterize as inaccurate comments that
Hannity had made previously in the program. He created
this implicature by violating the maxim of Manner "Avoid
ambiguity.'' Kevin's comment, "it just doesn't match up
with reality" implies what Hannity had previously told
the audience was inaccurate and might even be
deliberately deceitful. At the very least, Kevin is
challenging Hannity's research on the subject and at
worst, he is calling him a liar. If either charge were to
be made directly (i.e., 'Sean, you don't know what you're
talking about' or 'Sean, you're lying about this.'),
Kevin risks coming off as abrasive and confrontational,
thus possibly damaging his or her own credibility with
the audience. By being ambiguous, he can still get his
message across but project to the audience the image that
he is reasonable. Hannity, however, takes such great
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offense at even this veiled charge that he cuts Kevin's
comments off mid-sentence and responds by using an
implicature to attack Kevin's ethos by asking, "Do you
work for Landrieu?" This is an example of a violation of
the maxim of Relation as Kevin's employment situation is
irrelevant to the question of Sean's accuracy in his
previous comments regarding the Senate campaign. By
asking this question, Hannity is suggesting to the
audience that Kevin has an agenda and that his
credibility should be scrutinized. By casting doubt on
Kevin's character, Hannity marginalizes Kevin's attack
and makes Kevin's credibility the focus of the discourse
Kevin, recognizing that his ethos is now under attack,
immediately responds with a denial on line 1-4. Hannity
pursues the attack in a similar but somewhat softened
form of the same charge on line 1-5: "obviously voting
for Landrieu." Again Kevin denies the charge and this
time his response is more elaborate and emphatic.
In the above exchange there were three persuasive
attacks on ethos, one by Kevin and two by Hannity. Each
was perceived by the person under attack as an act which
might diminish their credibility in the eyes of the
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audience. The evidence of this is found in their
responses. Hannity, for instance, could have ignored
Kevin's attack, but instead he launched an aggressive
attack of his own against Kevin's credibility. Hannity's
attack on Kevin in line 1-3 was a bit more difficult to
totally ignore, however, as it was a' direct question. It
was a question, however, which could have easily been
answered with one word, "No," but Kevin felt the need to
be more emphatic, most probably in an attempt to rebuild
his ethos. When Hannity challenged him again with a
similar charge in line 1-5, Kevin could have once again
answered with one word, "Yes." However, once again, he
felt the need to elaborate, qualify and minimize his
support for Landrieu. This type of answer can only be
justified if the speaker believes that allowing himself
to be characterized as a campaign worker would damage his
credibility in the eyes of those he wishes to influence.
In a second example from the same conversation
between Hannity and Kevin, Hannity attacks the veracity
of Kevin's claim that he is a non-aligned voter.
1-24 Kevin: "Well, why don't you tell, tell
her record about constituent service. When
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people come to her with, for, with problem
they have, she works on it and solves it."
1-25 Hannity: "You know what you are, you're a
plant. You work for her. You're campaigning
for her."
1-26 Kevin: "No I don't."
1-27 Hannity: "And you're claiming you're
objective?"
1-28 Kevin: "You're calling me a liar, I don't
work for her."
In line 1-27, Hannity creates an implicature with
the phrase "And you're claiming to be objective?" This
phrase is a violation of the maxim of Manner "Avoid
ambiguity" in that he is appearing to be asking a
question, but in reality he is making a claim that he
believes that Kevin is not an average caller, but a
campaign worker who is trying to influence the audience
by taking on a false persona. In line 1-28, Kevin
recognizes the implicature and rebuts it by spelling it
out in plain English, "You're calling me a liar." This
statement is recognition by Kevin that Hannity's
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implicature is damaging to his ethos in the eyes of the
audience.
We see a similar pattern in the following example
taken from the Hannity and Colmes (television show) that
consists of Hannity's introduction of his guest Jake
McGoldrick, a San Francisco City/County Supervisor.
2-3 Hannity: "I've been looking at a history.
You guys have an incredible history of
controversial bills that you have passed.
First of all, before we get any further, what
kind of anti-terrorism experience do you have,
if any?"
In the sentence, "You guys have an incredible
history of controversial bills that you have passed,"
Hannity creates an implicature by violating the maxim of
Manner "Avoid Ambiguity." The word "incredible" has a
neutral meaning in that it can be used in either a
positive or a negative context. In the context of this
conversation, Hannity is being negative. By using the
word "incredible," to describe the Board of Supervisors'
history of passing what Hannity describes as
controversial legislation, Hannity is characterizing
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McGoldrick and his fellow board members of being outside 
of the political mainstream, thereby casting doubt upon
his credibility.
Finally, in an example found in conversation 4,
O'Reilly and Solay are discussing the anti-war position
of the "Not In Our Name" organization. First O'Reilly
introduces the subject and then without giving Solay a
chance to utter a word, uses implication to attack the
credibility of his guest.
4-1 O'Reilly: "In the 'Impact' segment tonight, we
told you in the 'Talking Points Memo' that the
group 'Not in Our Name' apparently believes the
Gulf War and the removal of Manuel Noriega in
Panama can be compared.to the terrorist attack
on 9-11. With us now, spokesperson for that
group, Miles Solay".
4-2 O'Reilly: "Um, How old are you?"
4-3 Solay: "I'm 21 years old".
4-4 O'Reilly: "21 years old, and what do you
do for a living?"
4-5 Solay: "I'm an organizer for the anti-war
movement and I travel around the country . . ."
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4-6 O'Reilly: "OK (unintelligible). You look
pretty young to be representing the likes
of Howard Zen, and ah Susan Sarandon, and
Jessie Jackson, Daniel Elsberg, but you're
the spokesperson."
4-7 Solay: "I'm a, I'm a spokesman, yes for
the 'Not in Our Name' project."
4-8 O'Reilly: "Alright now, you know my problem
ah, in this ad in the New York Times today,
which costs ah, had to cost more than $100,000,
so you guys must be raising some pretty prime
money there. Um, you basically say that America
had committed terrorism as well."
In the above segment, O'Reilly creates a series of
implicatures which questions Solay's intellectual
maturity (and therefore his ethos) by making an issue of
his age. The questions "How old are you?" in line 4-2 and
"What do you do for a living?" in line 4-4 violate the
maxim of Relation as Solay's age and employment are
irrelevant to the philosophy of the group that he is a
spokesperson for. O'Reilly's implied meaning is, however,
that they are, and suggests that Solay does not have
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enough life experience to fully understand this issue and
should not be taken seriously. In line 4-6, O'Reilly
confirms these implicatures by making the charge in a
direct manner, "You look pretty young to be representing
(this group)." And then he creates yet another
implicature through a violation of the maxim of Quality
by implying that Solay, by being a spokesman for this
group, is also a spokesman for specific individuals
(Howard Zen, Susan Sarandon, Jessie Jackson and Daniel
Elsberg). This violates Quality because there is no
evidence to support a connection between the individuals
named and Solay's group. O'Reilly's implied meaning is
not that Solay is actually a representative of these
individuals, but that he shares their philosophies. The
probable reason that O'Reilly did this was that he knows
that the mere names of these individuals have negative
connotations for a significant number of people in his
audience.
In all of the above examples, an attack was made
through implicature on the ethos of the implicature
producer's opponent. The emphasis that the person under
attack places on the response is an indication of the
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perception that this person has of how the charge against
his or her credibility will influence the audience. When
the person under attack feels the necessity to respond,
this suggests that they feel that the persuasive attack
may be effective in influencing the judgment of an
audience in regards to their credibility. In contrast,
when they choose not to respond, this indicates that they
do not believe that the attack will influence the
audience.
Persuasive Attacks on Logos
Persuasive attacks were also found which challenge
the logical foundations of an opponent's argument. In
chapter two it was noted that Aristotelian theory placed
a great deal of emphasis on how an argument was ..
constructed, favoring logical arguments which were either
inductive or deductive. Conversation 3 shows how debate
opponents repeatedly challenge each other's logic through
implicature.
3-12 Filner: "Well, you know, I think our young
men and women and a whole lot of, by the way
Bill, come from ah, San Diego which I
represent; ah that's the center of deployment.
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Ah they are put at a higher risk if we don't
go ah,, there with United Nations sanctions. We
ought to give this process a bit more time,
get the United Nations on our side and we pose
less risk then to our young men and ..."
3-13 O'Reilly: "Congressman, you can't believe
that the Iraqi military is any threat at all
to the United States military ..."
While the above statement by O'Reilly sounds almost
like a question, it is in fact an implied
characterization of Filner's position as reflected in his
previous statements. O'Reilly's tone is one of
astonishment that Filner could be arriving at such an
illogical conclusion. O'Reilly's attack claim is made by
an implicature produced through a violation of the maxim
of Quality: "Do not say that for which you lack adequate
evidence." In his statement, O'Reilly is extrapolating
Filner's comments on line 3-12 (in which Filner is
expressing concern for the increased risk of death and
injury to American troops) to a characterization of
Filner's overall opinion of what the outcome of the
conflict might be between the two militaries. O'Reilly
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was exaggerating Filner's comment in order to cast it in
an unfavorable light.
Later in the same conversation we find another
example of implicature used to attack logos. In the
following example, O'Reilly and Filner are discussing
possible scenarios in the post-Saddam Middle East
political climate. Here, O'Reilly uses ridicule through
implicature to suggest that Filner's logic is flawed
because the scenario he is suggesting is far-fetched and
unlikely to happen.
3-49 O'Reilly: "What happens in Pakistan? A few
crazies will revolt and Musharraf will put
them down. That's what always happens."
3-50 Filner: "And what if Musharraf doesn't, and
what if Al Queda gets a nuclear bomb?"
3-51 O'Reilly: "OK, what if the Wizard of Oz takes
over the State of California?"
3-52 Filner: "Now, we're looking at reasonable
things Bill, don't take (unintelligible)
ft
O'Reilly's reply in line 3-51 is an implicature
created by a violation of the maxim of Relation in that
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it does not address Filner's question in line 3-50
regarding the possibility of Al Queda obtaining a nuclear
weapon. In line 3-52 Filner recognizes that O'Reilly's
comment has attacked his logos by rebutting it with the
comment "Now, we're looking at reasonable things Bill. .
ft
While most of the persuasive attacks found in the
transcripts evoked a defensive response from the person
under attack, not all did. In contrast to the above
example, if the person being attacked perceives that the
accusation is not harmful to his or her image with the
audience that he or she is attempting to influence, then
the attack may be ignored. Two examples in which the
person being attacked did not respond to implied attacks
on credibility are detailed below.
The first example is found in conversation 3 in
which O'Reilly and Filner are discussing the advisability
of President Bush's plan to use military force to remove
Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.
3-11 O'Reilly: "But he (President Bush) can remove
Saddam Hussein, and he will. However, you're
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going to vote with Senator Kennedy not to
remove him, right?"
O'Reilly creates an implicature here through a
violation of the maxim of Relation by including the
phrase "with Senator Kennedy," as there had been no
previous mention of Senator Kennedy's position on the
matter. The only possible explanation for including
Senator Kennedy's name in the dialogue is to stir a
negative emotional reaction in the minds of the audience.
Senator Kennedy is a controversial leader of the left
wing of the Democratic Party, and by linking Filner's
vote to Kennedy, O'Reilly appears to be attempting to
make Kennedy an issue and/or to associate Filner with
Kennedy, thereby damaging his ethos in the eyes of
conservative members of the audience. In this example,
while the implicature might have had some negative effect
in the minds of some audience members, it did not alter
the course of the conversation. In this case, Filner
deflects the implied linkage by simply ignoring it.
Apparently he did not feel that it was detrimental- to his
argument to be linked to Senator Kennedy on this issue.
This proves to be an effective strategy as O'Reilly
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dropped this tactic and never brought up Kennedy's name
again.
The second example is found in the previously
discussed exchange between O'Reilly and Solay in which
O'Reilly attacks Solay's credibility due to his age (or
lack of life experience) and his associations with far-
left political activists.
4-6 Reilly: "OK (unintelligible). You look pretty
young to be representing the likes of Howard
Zen, and ah Susan Sarandon, and Jessie Jackson,
Daniel Elsberg, but you're the spokesperson."
4-7 Solay: "I'm the spokesman, yes, for the Not in
Our Name project."
As with the previous example, Solay chooses to
ignore O'Reilly's characterization of lacking life
experience or being associated with left wing peace
activists, because apparently he did not feel that these
accusations hurt his credibility with those in the
audience he wished to influence. Ignoring O'Reilly's
attack proved to be an effective strategy as immediately
after O'Reilly's initial attack, the dialogue
concentrated on a discussion of the anti-war stance taken
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by Solay's organization and avoided getting bogged down
in side issues.
Persuasive Defense
The theory of persuasive defense entails the concept
of image restoration following a persuasive attack.
Benoit and Wells (1996) offer five broad categories of
such defenses as follows: 1) Denial of the charge, 2)
Evasion of responsibility, 3) Mitigation of the charge,
4) The promise to take corrective action, and
5) Confession and begging forgiveness. Such defenses can
be accomplished by being direct, but also through the use
of implicature as demonstrated below in the previously
discussed exchange between Hannity and Kevin in which
Hannity is questioning the veracity of Kevin's claim to
be a non-aligned voter:
1-3 Hannity: "Do you work for Landrieu?"
1-4 Kevin: "No I don't work, I don't work for
either political campaign (unintelligible)."
1-5 Hannity: "Obviously voting for Landrieu."
1-6 Kevin: "Huh? Yeah, holding my nose and
doing it. I'm not a member of either political
party actually, so I am an independent."
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1-7 Hannity: "Look, I'm just, there's, there's I'm
just pointing out the differences. Landrieu has
voted, according to Senate role call votes
2001-2003, she voted with Hillary 84% of the
time."
Kevin actually uses two of Benoit and Wells'
persuasive defense tactics in the above exchange. The
first is the unambiguous and straight-forward denial
found in line 1-4. In responding to the second attack in
line 1-5, Kevin in line 1-6 employs an implicature to
mitigate, but not deny the entire charge. Kevin's
phraseology "Yeah, holding my nose and doing it" is an
example of the use of metaphor to create an implicature.
All metaphors are by definition implicatures as they
violate the maxim of Quality. This particular implicature
is created through a violation of the maxim of Relation
as well as Quality because the physical act of holding
your nose while casting a vote is irrelevant to one's
political affiliation. In this instance, Kevin is using
this implicature to counter Hannity's claim that he is
particularly supportive of Landrieu. While not denying
the charge that he is voting for Landrieu, he mitigates
84
the allegation by implying that he is not happy about the
choices he has.
Implicature and the Steerer's Position
As noted in chapter two, in the genre of television
and radio public affairs- talk shows, it is advantageous
to seize and maintain control as the 'steerer' (the one
who chooses the topic), because the steerer has the power
to define the terms of the debate. There are a number of
instances in the data where the speaker uses implicature
in an attempt to alter the discussion topic.
In the dialogue below, for example, Filner
successfully employs implicature (beginning in line 3-14)
to seize and maintain control as the steerer. Up until
this point (see 3-10 to 3-14), the conversation had been
wandering without a clear focus. After the implicature in
line 3-14, the conversation focused on nightmare
scenarios that Filner implied might result from military
action. This implicature comes in response to a bet that
O'Reilly proposed in line 3-13 as shown in the dialogue
below:
3-10 Filner: "But he (Bush) can't do it ("He acted
as if we can have ah, our tax cuts, we could
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help the economy and go into this war all at
the same time, (line 3-2)) and he knows he
can't."
3-11 O'Reilly: "But he can remove Saddam Hussein,
and he will, however, you're going to vote
with Senator Kennedy no to remove him, right?"
3-12 Filner: "Well, you know, I think our young
men and women and a whole lot of, by the way
Bill, come from ah, San Diego, which I
represent, ah that's the center of the
deployment. Ah, they are put at a higher risk
if we don't go ah, there with United Nations
sanctions. We- ought to give this process a
little bit more time, get the United Nations
sanctions on our side and we pose less risk
then to our young men and ..."
3-13 O'Reilly: "Congressman, you can't believe that
the Iraqi military is any threat at all to the
United States military. I mean, I will bet you
the best dinner in the Gaslight District of
San Diego, that the military action will not
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last more than a week. Are you willing to take
that bet?"
3-14 Filner: "We got a bet, and it's the Gaslamp,
but ah, we got a bet because, you know we'll
get rid of Saddam in a week Bill, I'll grant
you that. What's going to happen the day after
. as they say?"
3-15 O'Reilly: "I don't know; nobody knows."
3-16 Filner: "What's going to happen?"
3-17 O'Reilly: "You can't fight a war like that.
We didn't know what was going to happen after
World War II."
3-18 Filner: "You've got to have, you've got to
have a realistic assessment of what's going to
happen."
3-19 O'Reilly: "Alright let me give you an
assessment (unintelligible) ..."
3-20 Filner: "What's going to happen in the Middle
East?"
3-21 O'Reilly: "Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa."
3-22 Filner: "Is Al Queda going to get ah, nuclear
weapon?"
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3-23 O'Reilly: "Congressman, let me give you a
realistic assessment, then you can tell me
where I'm wrong. They'll find a guy like
Karzi, like they did in Afghanistan, they'll
install him as the interim president. They'll
retrain the Iraqi army, urn . .
3-24 Filner: "And how long they going to do this
in, a week? Two weeks?"
At the beginning of this segment in line 3-13,
O'Reilly attacks Filner's logos by characterizing the
congressman's opinion as holding to the belief that the
Iraqi military could seriously challenge the United
States military. At this point, O'Reilly is clearly in
control of the topic selection as Filner must either
agree to or rebut the accusation. Filner, in rebuttal,
simply agrees with O'Reilly's premise by saying, "you
know we'll get rid of Saddam in a week, I'll grant you
that," and then he uses an implicature to attack O'Reilly
by asking, "What's going to happen the day after, as they
say?" This implicature created through a violation of the
maxim of Manner, "avoid ambiguity." While it appears
that Filner is asking a question, he is actually making
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an attack on O'Reilly's logos, suggesting that O'Reilly
has not thought out the consequences of the U. S.
military action. Being ambiguous served Filner well in
this case, because it allowed him to imply dire
consequences, without spelling them out. If Filner had
suggested specific events, O'Reilly may have attacked hi
logic as being far-fetched. This way, however, Filner
creates a Pandora's Box and allows the audience to fill
it with their imaginations. This rhetorical maneuver by
Filner allows him to seize control of the topic in that
it changes it from O'Reilly's characterization of
Filner's position to O'Reilly having to defend his own
thought processes. By his implication that O'Reilly has
not thoroughly considered the consequences of the U. S.
military action, Filner forces O'Reilly to either rebut
this accusation or allow the audience to accept it as
fact, which would damage his credibility.
O'Reilly's appears to be at somewhat of a loss in
his response in line 3-15 ("I don't know; nobody knows")
and leaves himself wide open for Filner to continue the
attack, which he does in lines 3-16, 3-18, 3-20 and 3-22
In each of these four lines, Filner creates an
8.9
implicature through violations of the maxim of Relation,
by ignoring what O'Reilly is saying and repeating
variations of the same charge—that O'Reilly has not
thoroughly thought out his position. By creating these
implicatures which attack O'Reilly's logic, Filner
continues as the steerer of the conversation by putting
O'Reilly in a defensive position in which he must rebut
the accusation made in the implied claims.
Finally, in line 3-23, O'Reilly uses implicature to
set up a response which required that the topic be
changed: "Congressman, let me give you a realistic
assessment, and then you can tell me where I'm wrong."
The phrase "and then you can tell me where I'm wrong"
violates the maxim of Quality, "Do not say what you
believe to be false." It is obvious that O'Reilly does
not believe himself to be wrong. By saying so, however,
he takes the sheerer's position back, by implying that
Filner must either rebut his assessment which followed or
allow it to stand as an accepted fact in the eyes of the
audience. Filner's response in line 3-24 is a direct
response to O'Reilly's scenario, thereby proving that
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O'Reilly's tactic was effective in regaining control of
the topic selection.
The following segment demonstrates another attempt
to seize the steerer's role through the use of
implicature. This, time the attempt fails and the maxim
violation is turned against the implicature producer.
4-15 O'Reilly: "Boy, I love it. Let me stop you.
What do you mean perpetrating violence? Ah,.
unless I'm wrong, Saddam Hussein invaded
Kuwait, took over a sovereign country and we
rescued that country. You see that as
perpetrating violence?"
4-16 Solay: "Well then, let me ask you this, what
do you say about Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld met with Saddam Hussein in 1984 as
(unintelligible) . . ."
4-17 O'Reilly: "What do I have to say about it, I
don't care. It's not germane or relevant to
what we're talking about."
In Line 4-16 Miles Solay, the youth organizer for the Not
in Our Name anti-war organization, violates the maxim of
Relation in an effort to move the topic of the discourse
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away from the deeds Saddam Hussein (being discussed by
O'Reilly in Line 4-15) and turn to what he perceives as
the culpability of Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld
Solay's implicature in line 4-16 is rejected by O'Reilly
who indicates that Solay is violating the Cooperative
Principle by noting that Solay',s question is irrelevant
to the conversation. By doing this, O'Reilly feels
justified in refusing to discuss the implied charge that
Solay has made against Rumsfeld.
In this chapter, I have discussed a number of
aspects of the use of implicature in informal debate. We
have seen how implicature is used as a strategic
rhetorical tool in the debate format found in the
selected radio and television talk shows. In chapter
four, I will summarize these findings, suggest possible
motivations for the instances of implicature, and
consider how. the results relate to informal debate in
general.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study was inspired by my lifelong interest in
public affairs radio and television talk shows. One of
the more interesting things I learned through the process
of this study was that casual observations of a
phenomenon can be misleading. I originally envisioned the
focus of this study as how implicature assists a speaker
in seizing and maintaining the steerer's position as the
topic selector. While I found instances of this
phenomenon, it was not as pervasive as I had anticipated
in the data. Instead, the predominant patterns related to
the use of implicature to make or challenge claims and/or
defend against attacks made by an opponent.
I presented two research questions in chapter two:
1) Is implicature used as a strategy in argumentation?
2) If implicature is used as a purposeful strategy, what
advantage does it provide to the arguer? The inspiration
for the first question grew out of my causal observation
that the host of public affairs talk shows almost always
appeared to be the winner in debate. From this I
theorized that there might be some rhetorical tools being
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employed that the more successful talk show hosts
naturally developed. While implicature was found to be
used by the all hosts, it did not seem to be
significantly more than we might expect in naturally
occurring speech. Implicature was also found to be used
strategically by the guests. In the analysis of the
transcripts from both Hannity and O'Reilly it was
demonstrated that implicature was used by various
participants as an integral part of persuasive attacks,
persuasive defenses and on occasion, attempts to seize 
and/or maintain control of the steerer's position.
In regards to the second question, the benefits 
which may to be sought by the talk show arguers appear to 
have their foundations in the Aristotelian strategies of
rhetorical appeals and attacks based on pathos, ethos and
logos. The question remains, however, about what
advantages there are in using implicature as opposed to
straight-forward unambiguous language. Recalling some of 
the Gricean literature in chapter one, one answer may be
found in the concept of implicature as a face-saving
device (Brown & Levinson, 1978). As discussed previously
in chapter one, face is defined as the image that an
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individual wishes to project to others. It is therefore
logical that a speaker would consider it
counterproductive to make an attack on an opponent's
character or intellect which would reflect negatively on
the speaker's own character or intellect. As overt
claims, that are proved erroneous often reflect poorly
upon the person making the false claim, attacks made
through implicature provide the advantage that they can
be cancelled or mitigated by the speaker. An example of 
this is found in chapter three in the analysis of the
conversation between Hannity and Kevin. In this exchange,
Hannity makes the claim through implicature that Kevin
was a campaign worker by asking "Do you work for
Landrieu?" When Kevin strongly denies Hannity's implied
accusation, Hannity mitigates the claim charging that
Kevin at least is supportive of her ("Obviously voting
for Landrieu.") and therefore not the independent voter
he claims to be.
Another related motivation for using implicature
rather than straightforward language, which was found in
the data, is that the person being attacked can use it as
a defense mechanism to mitigate, but not entirely deny,
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the offense being charged by the speaker. An example of
this was found in chapter three in the analysis of the
conversation between Hannity and Kevin. In this exchange,
Hannity was implying that Kevin was a "planted" call and
that he was actually a campaign worker just pretending to
be an Independent voter. In response to Hannity's claim,
Kevin's reply indicated that while he intended to vote
for Landrieu, he would be "holding his nose" while doing
it. The phrase "holding my nose" implied that there are
aspects of Landrieu that he finds distasteful. By making
this negative remark about Landrieu, Kevin appears to be
attempting to restore any damage done to his image as an
independent voter caused by Hannity's attack.
Finally, expressiveness was found to be a motivation
in using implicature in argumentation. Referring back to
Chen (1993) which was discussed in chapter one, one
motivation for the use of implicature is the speaker's
desire to add impact and emotion to his or her message.
An example of this is found in conversation 3 between
O'Reilly and Filner where in line 3-13 O'Reilly says,
"Congressman, you can't believe that the Iraqi military
is any threat at all to the United States military." By
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using this implicature, O'Reilly is conveying
astonishment and disbelief that Filner could reach such a
conclusion.
One of the limitations of this study is that the
corpus of data was small. While this precluded reaching
broad conclusions regarding common elements of rhetorical
strategies, the data does indicate that implicature is a 
useful strategic tool in informal debate, especially in
framing the topic of the debate and in making persuasive
attacks and defenses.
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APPENDIX
TRANSCRIPTS OF CONVERSATIONS
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Conversation 1: Transcript of conversation from the Sean 
Hannity Radio Show (KABC,12-5-02) Participants are 
program host, Sean Hannity and caller, Kevin.
1-1 Hannity: Alright now, Kevin, Louisiana, let's start 
with you on the Sean Hannity Show. What's up Kevin?
1-2 Kevin: Hello Sean, I'm just listening to you here, 
describe the election in Louisiana and explain like 
what you think are the differences between Landrieu 
and Terrill and it just doesn't match up with 
reality, and I was just wondering . . .
1-3 Hannity: Do you work for the Landrieu?
1-4 Kevin: No I don't work, I don't work for either 
political campaign (unintelligible) . . .
1-5 Hannity: Obviously voting for Landrieu.
1-6 Kevin: Huh? Yeah, holding my nose and doing it. I'm 
not a member of either political party actually, so 
I am independent.
1-7 Hannity: Look, I'm just, there's, there's, I'm just 
pointing out the differences. Landrieu has voted, 
according to Senate role call votes 2001-2002, she 
voted with Hillary Clinton 84% of the time.
1-8 Kevin: Um, now what's, what, the statistic you 
know? You don't have a statistic.
1-9 Hannity: Eighty four.
1-10 Kevin: For Terrill, but I'm sure that there's 
Republicans that have voted for Clinton too.
1-11 Hannity: Terrill's not in the Senate.
1-12 Kevin: Yes I, I know, that's why I said there's no 
statistics like that for Terrill.
1-13 Hannity: But, but Mary Landrieu has been out there 
saying that, that, that Terrill is going to be a 
rubber stamp for President Bush.
99
1-14 Kevin: Which is true.
1-15 Hannity: Well, is she a rubber stamp for Hillary 
Clinton?
1-16 Kevin: No.
1-17 Hannity: Well, well look, I'm just saying for those 
of you in Louisiana, and let me tell you, this is 
an important seat, this, this . . .
1-18 Kevin: But you're just not, se you're not
describing what's really happening in the State. 
You're up there, like somewhere far away from us .
1-19 Hannity: Far, far away.
1-20 Kevin: You've probably visited, you probably
visited us maybe once or twice, stayed in a hotel 
for a day, a night or two, and you're not real . .
1-21 Hannity: I was just down, I was just down in Baton 
Rouge during the Hannitization of America Tour, 
what are you talking?
1-22 Kevin: (unintelligible) So you saw like a little 
bit of Baton rouge (unintelligible) . . .
1-23 Hannity: So what does that have to do any, what
does that. I'm telling you her record. What does me 
having been down there, how many times, how long 
I've been down there, what hotel I stayed in, what 
does that have to do with this?
1-24 Kevin: Well, why don't you tell, tell her record
about constituent service. When people come to her 
with, for, with problem they have, she works on it 
and solves it.
1-25 Hannity: You know what you are, you are a plant.
You work for her. You're campaigning for her.
1-26 Kevin: No I don't.
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1-27 Hannity: And you're claiming you're objective.
1-28 Kevin: You're calling me a liar, I don't work for 
her.
1-29 Hannity: I absolutely don't believe you. I don't 
believe you.
1-30 Kevin: Well its true, I don't work for her and I 
don't work for Susie Terrill. I'm an independent.
1-31 Hannity: And who are you voting for?
1-32 Kevin: Huh?
1-33 Hannity: Who are you voting for?
1-34 Kevin: I told you, I going to vote, I'm going to 
hold my nose and I'm going to vote for Landrieu.
1-35 Hannity: Yeah.
1-36 Kevin: I disagree with most of what Landrieu ah, ah
1-37 Hannity: Well here's what I can, I can tell you,
here's what I can tell you about Landrieu's voting 
record, which, by the way is quite often at odds 
with John Breaux. Breaux was on TV with Hannity and 
Combs last night . . .
1-38 Kevin: Actually not, not quite often, they vote
they vote together more often then they vote apart.
1-39 Hannity: Yeah and (unintelligible), he's telling me 
that he's not a campaign operative, OK, we'll play 
this game Kevin.
1-40 Kevin: No, what's wrong? I've gone and researched 
facts (unintelligible) . . .
1-41 Hannity: Kevin, you're a campaign operative.
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1-42 Kevin: (Unintelligible) that's what voters suppose 
to do is go and research facts?
1-43 Hannity: I have, I have been in this business long 
enough to know when somebody is a campaign 
operative, calling in.
1-44 Kevin: Well, your instincts are wrong in this case.
1-45 Hannity: No they're not.
1-46 Kevin: Because, I'm not a campaign operative.
1-47 Hannity: Alright now, here's Landrieu voted to
allow tax payer finding of drug, uh, user, needle 
exchange program in D. C.
1-48 Kevin: OK, I happen to think that's a good program.
1-49 Hannity: Hang on, can I, can I, can I finish this 
please. Let me, hang on, we'll give you time, she 
voted with Hillary Clinton on, for same sex partner 
health benefits in D. C., for city employees. She 
voted with Hillary to allow abortions for overseas 
military bases, voted numerous times to gut the 
Bush tax cut. Ah, voted against the marriage 
penalty and death tax relief. Urn, she voted 
opposite of John Breaux to prohibit federal funding 
of abortions. She voted, ah, the opposite of Breaux 
on mandatory trigger locks and the federal funding 
of school distribution of morning after pills. And 
that's her record, that's where she stands, that's 
what I have researched.
1-50 Kevin (unintelligible) You're playing up the
abortion factor here and that's a, that's a fair 
issue. But I' going to suggest to you that's not a, 
not a mainstream American issue, that most people 
in America view the abortion issue as, as, as only 
a minor component of a- candidate.
1-51 Hannity: Hey Kevin, stay on the line alright, stay 
right there, don't hang up, OK? As a matter of 
fact, hang on, we're going to put, ah him, now let
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me just do a quick pool. Paul in New York, does he 
sound like a Landrieu campaign operative to you?
1-52 Paul: Absolutely.
1-53 Hannity: Absolutely, alright. Ah, Phil in Berger
County, does he sound like a campaign operative to 
you?
1-54 Phil: Absolutely, you're right Sean.
1-55 Hannity: Thank you. John, does he sound like a 
campaign operative to you?
1-56 John: Absolutely.
1-57 Hannity: Hey Chris in the Bronx, does he sound like 
a campaign operative to you?
1-58 Chris: (unintelligible).
1-59 Hannity: Hey Chris (Sean recognizes this caller as 
an acquaintance and bypasses the question) How are 
you, hang on buddy. Skip in New Jersey, does he 
sound like a campaign operative to you?
1-60 Skip: Sure does, but I'm not sure.
1-61 Hannity: Alright, there you go alright, well 
alright, there you go Kevin.
1-62 Kevin: OK Sean, here's what I'll do. You get me off 
the air, you take me off the air. I will give, I 
will give somebody my name, my address, my phone 
number and my Social Security number . . .
1-63 Hannity: Yeah . . .
1-64 Kevin: And you check with, with the Landrieu or 
anybody you like . . .
1-65 Hannity: Alright.
1-66 Kevin: I don't work for anybody (unintelligible).
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1-67 Hannity: We'll take it at face, value, but look,
we're glad you called anyway, and next time I'm in 
New Orleans I'm going to look you up.
1-68 Kevin: I'm not in New Orleans, Shreveport, Sean.
1-69 Hannity: Ah, next time . . .
1-70 Kevin: We had Bush here yesterday, 5,000 people
showed up, just turned out, just to see him. It was 
great.
1-71 Hannity: Well good, I appreciate you calling.
1-72 Kevin: OK, thanks.
1-73 Hannity: Alright buddy, thanks. (Sean, talking to 
the audience after Kevin has hung up) I've been at 
this too long, I, either too cynical, or my 
instincts are right.
Conversation 2: Transcript of conversation between Sean 
Hannity and Jake McGoldrick, a San Francisco Supervisor. 
(The Hannity and Colmes TV Show. 1/22/03. The FOX News 
Channel).
2-1 Hannity: Well, first, yesterday, the San Francisco 
Board of Supervisors passed a resolution opposing 
the Patriot Act on the grounds that it violates 
civil rights. Joining us, the man who introduced 
the resolution, Jake McGoldrick. Jake, how are you?
2-2 McGoldrick: Good evening.
2-3 Hannity: I've been looking at a history. You guys 
have an incredible history of controversial bills 
that you have passed. First of all, before we get 
any further, what kind of anti-terrorism experience 
do you have, if any?
2-4 McGoldrick: Ah, I suppose you'd want to figure out 
what anti-terrorism experience means. I have, first 
of all and foremost, the same kind of anti-
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terrorism experience that everybody in America had 
on the 9-11, ah . . .
2-5 Hannity: I, I got that. What so you specifically. 
What training do you have? I mean you're gonna, 
you're gonna tell the federal government what to do 
and lecture them and pass this anti-patriot act.
2-6 McGoldrick: (Unintelligible).
2-7 Hannity: I want to know what experience you have, 
you can inform our viewers, you know, the level of 
expertise you have in this matter.
2-8 McGoldrick: Sure, we have a police department. We 
have a, an anti-terrorism unit in our police 
department, and that unit is cooperating with the 
federal government and any agencies and justice 
department.
2-9 Hannity: That's it? What have you done? What have 
you done?
2-10 McGoldrick: I'm here as a public official, I think 
the personalization is something you guys were just 
talking about on the previous program about Bush 
and personalization.
2-11 Hannity: Yeah.
2-12 McGoldrick: So I don't think . . .
2-13 Hannity: So the bottom line is that you have zero.
2-14 McGoldrick: I don't think we ought to go down that 
(unintelligible) . . .
2-15 Hannity: No, I think we should.
2-16 McGoldrick: I have a lot of experience.
2-17 Hannity: You have none.
2-18 McGoldrick: A, a legislator in the city and county 
of San Francisco, and if you don't recognize that
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(unintelligible) then maybe we need to start over 
or something here.
2-19 Hannity: But you have no anti-terrorism experience. 
Alright, because this is the experts . . .
2-20 McGoldrick: Where are you going?
2-21 Hannity: Here's where I'm going?
2-22 McGoldrick: Try to take us there. Keep the audience 
and me involved with it.
2-23 Hannity: If you pay close attention, you may learn 
something.
2-24 McGoldrick: That's what I'm hoping for.
2-25 Hannity: The experts, the people that know, the
people in law enforcement, the people that are on 
the front lines combating terrorism . . .
2-26 McGoldrick: (unintelligible).
2-27 Hannity: Will you let me finish, not you, you're a 
politician, who passes laws without experience.
2-28 McGoldrick: (Laughter).
2-29 Hannity: But these guys say that to do their jobs 
and to protect us, they need wiretaps, rov, roving 
wiretaps to follow people. They have, they have in 
every single case judicial oversight, so we have a 
check and balance in the system. Ah we have longer 
detention of terrorist suspects, these, ah, ways, 
to protect money laundering. So if you have your 
way, without any personal experience, you want to 
stop them from doing their jobs, that they are 
trained to do to stop terrorist and protect us.
I find that amazing, sir.
2-30 McGoldrick: This is a very interesting type of lead 
question, so let's lead right into it. The fact of 
the matter is, and get it straight, I'm not just 
Jake McGoldrick, an individual who happens to be
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standing on the corner out some place in San 
Francisco. I'm coming here from city hall, where we 
have as I said, a police enforcement that works 
with our federal government on terrorism. The whole 
point of what we and 27 other jurisdictions in the, 
in the whole country have done is to assert our 
patriotism by saying that the civil liberties, that 
are indeed the landmark of this particular culture 
that we have had for over 200 years are not to be 
jeopardized by ex, excesses in investigations.
Conversation 3: Transcript of conversation between Bill 
O'Reilly and Bob Filner, Democrat Congressman, 
representing San Diego. (The O'Reilly Factor TV show 
1/29/03. The FOX News Channel.)
3-1 O'Reilly: So this vote was taken overwhelmingly in 
the House 296 to 133 ah, that Congress approve 
military action in October, Why should we take 
another vote?
3-2 Filner: Well a lot of things have changed ah, since 
then ah, you know ah, were ah, we got North Korea 
on the horizon, we got the economy in recession 
ah, and yet, you know what the President left off, 
out of last, what not speech that was so ah, as you 
say, approved by the American public? Once they 
start think about what he left off, they may have 
second thoughts. He did not tell us, he did not 
tell the American people, what are the costs and 
consequences of this war? What are the choices, the 
sacrifices we're going to have to make? He acted as 
if we can have ah, we can have our tax cuts, we 
could help the economy and go into this war all at 
the same time. Just can't do it, and you got to lay 
that out.
3-3 O'Reilly: Well, you can do it but you're going to
run up a huge deficit, and we're going to talk that 
with an economist coming up behind you,
Congressman.
3-4 Filner: I mean there's no way Congress would 
approve (unintelligible) . . .
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3-5 O'Reilly: Look Congressman, you know what he did.
He said, I'm going to give everybody everything, so 
everybody likes him and then you guys will tear it 
to pieces and ah (unintelligible) . . .
3-6 Filner: And when they realize, and they realize
that he was, he was really defrauding them, or he 
was (unintelligible). . .
3-7 O'Reilly: Ahhh, he's not defrauding them he's just
3-8 Filner: Sure he was.
3-9 O'Reilly: Basically saying this is what I want to 
do.
3-10 Filner: But he can't do it and he knows he can't.
3-11 O'Reilly: But he can remove Sadam Hussein, and he 
will, however, you're going to vote with Senator 
Kennedy not to remove him, right?
'3-12 Filner: Well, you know, I think our young men and 
women and a whole lot of, by the way Bill, come 
from ah, San Diego, which I represent, ah that's 
the center of the deployment. Ah, they are put at a 
higher risk if we don't go ah, there with United 
Nations sanctions. We ought to give this process a 
little bit more time, get the United Nations on our 
side and we pose less risk then to our young men 
and . . .
3-13 O'Reilly: Congressman, you can't believe that the 
Iraqi military is any threat at all to the United 
States military. I mean, I will bet you the best 
dinner in the Gaslight District of San Diego, that 
the military action will not last more than a week. 
Are you willing to take that bet?
3-14 Filner: We got a bet, and it's the Gas Lamp, but
ah, we got a bet because, you know we'll get rid of 
Sadam in a week Bill, I'll grant you that. What's 
going to happen the day after as they say?
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3-15 O'Reilly: I don't know, nobody knows.
3-16 Filner: What's going to happen?
3-17 O'Reilly: You cant fight a war like that. We didn't 
know what was going .to happen after World War II.
3-18 Filner: You've got to have, you've got to have a 
realistic assessment of what's going to happen.
3-19 O'Reilly: Alright, let me give you a realistic 
assessment (unintelligible) . . .
3-20 Filner: What's going to happen in the Middle East?
3-21 O'Reilly: Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa.
3-22 Filner: Is Al Queda going to get ah, nuclear 
weapon?
3-23 O'Reilly: Congressman, let me give you a realistic 
assessment, then you can tell me where I'm wrong. 
They'll find a guy like Karzai, like they did in 
Afghanistan. They'll install him as the interim 
president. They'll retrain the Iraqi army, urn . . .
3-24 Filner: And how long they going to do this in, a 
week? Two weeks?
3-25 O'Reilly: Ahhh, we're going to do the same thing 
we're doing in Afghanistan (unintelligible) . . .
3-26 Filner: Yeah, and we've completely lost interest 
there. We have not made any progress.
3-27 O'Reilly: That's not true at all (unintelligible)
we've made a lot of progress in training that army.
3-28 Filner: Our guys are under a threat, total threat 
of a terrorist attack at all times, come on. You 
want to leave our boys in Baghdad for how long?
3-29 O'Reilly: I don't want to leave our boys anywhere.
I don't want my family to be threatened by anthrax, 
OK?
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3-30 Filner: Bill, that's what's going to happen.
3-31 O'Reilly: It happened, in Bosnia. You guys didn't
say anything about that. We had a regime change in 
Belgrade. You didn't say anything about. This is a 
selective deal.
3-32 Filner: No its (unintelligible) . . .
3-33 O'Reilly: Clinton did the Bosnia deal. Clinton did 
the Belgrade deal. You didn't say a word.
3-34 Filner: And you were against it, right?
3-35 O'Reilly: No I was for it (unintelligible) . . .
3-36 Filner: (unintelligible) All the Republicans in 
Congress were against it.
3-37 O'Reilly: But, I'm not a Republican, I'm an
independent. I want to do what's best for this 
country. And what's best for the country and my 
family and your family is to remove this guy and 
stop making excuses for it.
3-38 Filner: Well, I'd like to get rid of this guy, but 
I think we've- got to do it in a-more measured 
fashion. I think we got to make sure 
(unintelligible) . . .
3-39 O'Reilly: Ahhhh, that's weakness, that's weakness.
We're strong enough to remove him. We should remove 
him. He's violated the U. N. mandates and you're 
showing weakness. You're going to get killed on 
this Congressman, you and your party and going to 
get killed.
3-40 Filner: Well, we'll see. In the long run, .strength, 
you know, sometimes you've got to be a little bit 
humble about the use of your power. And the United 
States, I think, will be the more powerful, more 
morally responsible . . .
3-41 O'Reilly: With all due respect ... ,
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3-42 Filner: If we take (unintelligible) with us and do 
it right.
3-43 O'Reilly: With all due respect, in a war on terror 
to protect American people from savages who will 
kill us, we don't have to be humble there, we 
(unintelligible) . . .
3-44 Filner: Let me tell you . . .
3-45 O'Reilly: If you're a terrorist enabler or a
terrorist, we're going to come in and kick your 
butt. We don't need humility in that
(unintelligible), not with terrorist.
3-46 Filner: But you need some smarts Bill, and listen, 
if we are going to increase the risk of terrorism 
by what we do, we shouldn't do it, right?
3-47 O'Reilly: That calculation is impossible to make, 
it's impossible to make, and you don't operate out 
of weakness. I'll give you the last word
Congressman.
3-48 Filner: Let's take a, let's take a little bet. What 
happens the week after we take out Sadam, what 
happens in Pakistan?
3-49 O'Reilly: What happens in Pakistan? A few crazies 
will revolt and Musharraf will put them down.
That's what always happens.
3-50 Filner: And what if Musharraf doesn't? And what if 
Al Queda gets a nuclear bomb?
3-51 O'Reilly: OK, what if the Wizard of Oz takes over 
the State of California?
3-52 Filner: Now, we're looking at reasonable things 
Bill, don't take (unintelligible) . . .
3-53 O'Reilly: you're operating out of fear, and I'm 
operating out of strength.
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3-54 Filner: I'm operating out of some intellectual ah, 
assessment of the risks.
3-55 O'Reilly: Alright Congressman, we appreciate your 
point of view very much, and thanks for the lively 
debate.
Conversation 4: Transcript of conversation between Bill 
O'Reilly and Miles Solay, an organizer for an anti war 
group. (The O'Reilly Factor TV show 1/27/03. FOX News 
Channel).
4-1 O'Reilly: In the "Impact" segment tonight, we told 
you in the "Talking Points Memo" that the group 
"Not in Our Name", apparently believes the Gulf War 
and the removal of Manuel Noriega in Panama, can be 
compared to the terrorist attack on 9-11. With us 
now, spokesperson for that group, Miles Solay.
4-2 Um, how old are you?
4-3 Solay: I'm 21 years old.
4-4 O'Reilly: 21 years old, and what do you do for a 
living?
4-5 Solay: I'm an organizer for the anti-war movement 
and I travel around the country . . .
4-6 O'Reilly: OK (unintelligible). You look pretty
young to be representing the likes of Howard Zen, 
and ah, Susan Sarandon, and Jessie Jackson, Daniel 
Elsberg, but you're the spokesperson.
4-7 Solay: I'm a, I'm a spokesperson, yes, for the Not 
in Our Name project.
4-8 O'Reilly: Alright, now, you know my problem ah, in 
this ad in the New York Times today, which costs 
ah, had to cost more than $100,000, so you guys 
must be raising some pretty prime money there. Um, 
you basically say that America has committed 
terrorism as well.
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4-9 Solay: Well what we say in the "Not in Our Name"
statement of conscience is that it precedes from a 
standpoint of internationalism, that American lives 
are not worth more than lives anywhere else around 
the world. And when we say that we also shared in 
the ah, horrific shock of September 11th and we 
also share in the grief that the people witnessed 
in Panama, in Vietnam, in September 11th, 1973 when 
ah United States had regime change in Chili and we 
say that we can't stand by while our, while our 
government is about to commit horrendous acts of 
injustice around the government, around the world.
4-10 O'Reilly: You point to Baghdad (unintelligible) are 
you basically saying that, that, that Gulf war was 
wrong?
4-12 Solay: What we are saying is that the 200,000
civilians that were killed in the first Gulf War, 
the 500,000 children who have died because of 
malnutrition were the (unintelligible) . . .
4-13 O'Reilly: Who's fault was that? I believe that's 
the fault of the leadership of Iraq, correct? Or 
would you have stood by and allowed them to take 
over Kuwait?
4-14 Solay: Well, We're, we're, we're holding
responsible our government, a government who is 
perpetrating violence, a government who is now . .
4-15 O'Reilly: Boy, I love it. Let me stop you. What do 
you mean perpetrating violence? Ah, unless I'm 
wrong, Sadam Hussein invaded Kuwait, took over a 
sovereign country and we rescued that country. You 
see that as perpetrating violence?
4-16 Solay: Well then, let me ask you this, what do you 
have to say about Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld met with Sadam Hussein in 1984 as 
(unintelligible) ...
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4-17 O'Reilly: What do I have to say about it, I don't 
care about it. Its no't germane or relevant to what 
we're talking about.
4-18 Solay: Well, that was, that was when Sadam Hussein 
gasses the Kurds and Iranian troops in the Iran- 
Iraq war.
4-19 O'Reilly: What do I have to say about the war of 
1812? It doesn't matter. What matters is that you 
are saying in this advertisement, signed by some 
very, very high profile people . . .
4-20 Solay: Thousands . . .
4-21 O'Reilly: That there are terrorist here.
4-22 Solay No, that's not we (unintelligible) . . .
4-23 O'Reilly: That we have no more, sure you are,
you're basically saying that we shook our heads at 
the terrible scenes of carnage, even as we recalled 
similar scenes . . .
4-24 Solay: Um hm.
4-25 O'Reilly: You're comparing 9-11 alright, um hm . .
4-26 Solay: The World trade Center and the Pentagon to 
Baghdad and Panama City, um hm.
4-27 O'Reilly: That's obscene, that is so, so offensive 
to clear thinking Americans. Don't you have any 
clue how offensive that is?
4-28 Solay: Well, in fact we are people who live in this 
country and you know as well as I know that, quiet 
as its kept, there are millions of people in this 
country, millions in this country, who are joining 
those internationally, who do not want to see an 
unjust, immoral and illegitimate war.
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4-29 O'Reilly: Alright, and you have a right to that 
opinion and I'm not criticizing you for that 
opinion OK?
4-30 Solay: What I'm saying about the "Not in Our Name" 
statement of conscience is that its not that its un 
American, its a, it's a statement that's standing 
with the people of the world, we're not granting 
privilege (unintelligible) . . .
4-31 O'Reilly: You can saying that you're standing with 
the people of the world, but if they believe this, 
you're standing with the pinheads of the world, who 
don't know anything. To basically say that the 
United States Government, removing Manuel Noriega .
4-32 Solay: Who was an ally of the United States.
4-33 O'Reilly: I don't care, it doesn't, so was Stalin, 
OK. I mean, you have no idea how history unfolds 
and how it different. It fogs in, it fogs out. It 
depends on the circumstance. Manuel Noriega running 
a cartel, a drug distribution cartel out of Panama, 
and we don't have the moral right to go in there 
and remove him? That's insane.
4-34 Solay: What we're saying here in the "Not in Our
Name" statement of conscience, again and what we're 
saying in the burgeoning anti war movement in this 
country and internationally, is that a country like 
our own, who is not only threatening to use weapons 
of mass destruction, but has, including nuclear 
weapons, and is now declaring to use it
(unintelligible) . . .
4-35 O'Reilly: Of course it has, it ended World War II.
4-36 Solay: and is, and is threatening to use them as 
first strike, why is it that the United States 
going for regime change in Iraq, but not other 
countries in the region (unintelligible) . . .
4-37 O'Reilly: But, listen, I didn't hear a word from 
you, Miles, or any of your organization when
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President Clinton initiated the regime change in 
Yugoslavia. You didn't say a word about it, and 
none of these pinheads would have signed it because 
they liked Clinton. What this is about is you don't 
like Bush, you don't like the Republicans, and 
you're going to use this shotty, cheap and 
denigrating propaganda, offensive to the families 
who lost people, to make your point
(unintelligible) . . .
4-38 Solay: There are family members from September 11th 
who have signed.
4-39 O'Reilly: Nobody signed this ad on September 11th.
4-40 Solay: Jeremy Glick, Jeremy Glick, who lost his 
father in it, in September 11th has signed this 
statement.
4-41 O'Reilly: Well, let me see that.
4-42 Solay: As well as a group called (unintelligible).
4-43 O'Reilly: We'll get that guy, Jeremy Glick on
tomorrow if that's the case (unintelligible) . . .
4-44 Solay: Let me just make that point right here.
4-45 O'Reilly: Go ahead.
4-46 Solay: We're, we're taking responsibility, like I 
said for the injustices that our own government is 
committing, and right now our government has 
dropped troops and assassins and commandos . . .
4-47 O'Reilly: We know that, and there's a reason they 
have ...
4-48 Solay: In dozens of countries around the world.
4-49 O'Reilly: Alright, Jeremy Glick, OK, we're going to 
get him. Listen, again, you want to be against the 
war, fine, and I'll respect that dissent, alright? 
You want to say that we are the moral equivalent to 
terrorist . . .
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